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        We investigate the link between firm size and risk-taking among financial 
institutions during the period of 1998—2008 and make four contributions. First, 
size is positively correlated with risk-taking measures even when controlling for 
other observable firm characteristics, such as market-to-book asset ratio, corporate 
governance, and ownership structure. This is consistent with the notion that “too-
big-to-fail” policies distort the risk incentives of financial institutions. Second, a 
simple decomposition of the risk measure, the Z-score, reveals that financial firms 
engage in excessive risk-taking mainly through leverage. Third, we find that the 
recently developed governance variable, measured as the median director dollar 
stockholding, has a substantial impact on reducing firms’ risk-taking. Lastly, 
investment banks are generally riskier than commercial banks. These findings 
suggest that rather than capping the firm size, it is more effective for policymakers 
to control a financial firm’s risk-taking by strengthening regulations on capital 
requirement; they also provide justification for the functional separation of 
investment banking from wholesale financial services. In terms of corporate risk 
management policy, these findings suggest that the excessive risk-taking problem 
can potentially be attenuated by focusing on the governance structure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
     “Too-big-to-fail policies offer systemically important firms the explicit or implicit promise of 
a bailout when things go wrong. These policies are destructive, for several reasons. First, because 
the possibility of a bailout means a firm’s stakeholders claim all the profits but only some of the 
losses, financial firms that might receive government support have an incentive to take extra risk. 
The firm’s shareholders, creditors, employees, and management all share the temptation. The 
result is an increase in the risks borne by society as a whole.” 
                                                    ———— The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System 
        Too-big-to-fail (TBTF) is a concept that governments have to bail out a failing financial 
institution (FI) because its failure may present a threat to the proper functioning of the financial 
intermediation process and cause severe disruption to the economy. When firms are perceived 
TBTF, they may have a propensity to assume excessive risks to profit in the short term. Indeed, 
TBTF policy has been blamed by many, including the Obama administration, as one of the main 
factors causing distortion in financial firms’ risk-taking incentives, which played a pivotal role in 
the recent financial crisis.  The risk distortion resulting from TBTF policies are often referred to 
as the “moral hazard” problem in the finance literature.1  
        In turn, policy makers propose an array of regulations to reshape financial institutions. 
Specifically designed to address the TBTF issue, suggestions such as limiting the size of 
financial institutions have been proposed by the Obama administration along with academics.2 
The reason for dealing with size directly is that the regulators believe that the larger the firm is, 
the more likely it is systematically important or TBTF.3 On the one hand, proponents of such a 
proposal argue that it will deter financial firms from becoming so large that they put the broader 
 
        1See Boyd, Jagannathan and Kwak (2009) for a detailed description of this problem 
        2 See, for example, “Proposal Set to Curb Bank Giants”, Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2010, A2. Boyd, 
Jagannathan and Kwak (2009) and Walter (2009) also propose size limits on firms. 
        3 We use the term TBTF and systematically important interchangeably hereafter. 
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economy at risk and distort normal competitive forces. Indeed, Baker and McArthur (2009) 
estimate that the gap of funding costs between small and TBTF firms averaged 0.29 percentage 
points in the period 2000 through 2007, and that this gap widened to an average of 0.78 
percentage points from 2008 through 2009. Rime (2005) finds that the TBTF status has a 
significant, positive impact on bank issuer ratings. Lastly, using an international sample of 
banks, Kemirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) find that systemically large banks achieve lower 
profitability and operate with higher risk. Their results suggest that it is not in the bank 
shareholders’ interests but is in managers’ interests for a bank to become large relative to its 
national economy as it hurts the owners but benefits managers through higher manager pay and 
status. On the other hand, many problems are associated with this reform. First of all, it is 
practically impossible to determine the correct size threshold; secondly, this simple size metric 
will still miss many small firms that perform critical payment processing and pose significant 
systemic risk, even if the first issue can be solved (Stern and Feldman, 2009). In addition, 
opponents of such a proposal often cite the literature on scale of economy and are concerned 
such restraint could weaken the global competitiveness of the U.S. financial industry and cause 
loss of market share. Further, Dermine and Schoenmaker (2010) argue that capping the size is 
not the best tool, based on the finding that countries with relatively small banks faced large 
bailout cost; in addition, they caution that capping the size can have unintended effects, such as a 
lack of credit risk diversification. 
        Is size the problem? This paper attempts to shed light on the issue by studying the size 
effect on the risk-taking of financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment banks 
and life insurance companies. Using data on the size and risk-taking of financial institutions from 
1998 to 2008, we investigate whether cross-sectional variation in the scale of firms is related to 
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heterogeneity in risk-taking. Our measures of risk-taking are comprehensive. They include a 
model-based measure such as the Z-score 4 , a market-based measure that captures market’s 
perception about firms’ risk-taking such as volatility of stock return, and an accounting-based 
measure that such as write-downs.5 We focus primarily on Z-score; the other risk measures serve 
as a robustness check. Our baseline analysis is to regress the Z-score on firm size along with 
other firm characteristics.  
        If size does affect risk-taking as measured by Z-score, then an interesting question is, how 
does size affect the components of Z-score? This question is interesting because if we can find 
out what factors might drive the relation between firm size and risk-taking, we can target the 
risk-taking problem of financial institutions more directly.  We argue that if limiting the size 
focuses on exclusively the normative aspects of the issue of risk-taking, then the factor analysis 
would address the positive aspects of the problem. We answer this question by regressing each of 
the components of Z-score on firm size and other firm characteristics.  
        Motivated by proposals that would treat TBTF firms differently. 6  we also investigate 
whether TBTF firms behave differently from small firms as a natural extension to our baseline 
analysis. We first define firms as TBTF when they pass a commonly-agreed size threshold (for 
example, $10 billion in assets), then interact the TBTF firm dummy with size. We establish the 
following findings. First, firm size is positively correlated with risk-taking, even when 
controlling for observable firm characteristics such as market-to-book ratio and ownership 
 
        4 Z‐score measures the distance to default and a higher Z‐score implies more stability. It is calculated as the 
sum of return on asset and capital asset ratio divided by volatility of asset return. Theoretic development of this 
variable from Boyd and Runkle (1993) is attached in Appendix A. Z‐score has been used extensively as a measure of 
bank risk recently; see, for example, Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006); Laeven and Levine ( 2009); Houston, et al 
(2010); Beltratti and Stulz (2010). 
        5 See Chesney, Stromberg and Wagner (2010) for a description of this variable. 
        6 For example, the Obama administration proposes using tax policy to punish large banks based on their 
exposure to risk. See “White House’s Tax Proposal Targets Big Banks’ Risks”, Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2010. 
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structure, which are believed have an effect on risk-taking. For instance, a one-standard deviation 
increase in size will decrease Z-score by 4 points, which is sufficient to make a capital-
constrained firm fail. To ensure that that our result is not contaminated by the issue of 
endogeneity, as prominent in the corporate finance research, we apply the identification strategy 
of instrumental variable, where we instrument our endogenous variable, firm size, with the 
dummy variable for whether a firm is incorporated in Delaware. To further rule out the 
possibility that our result is driven by any firm-specific unobservable effect, we employ the firm 
fixed-effect model. We show that our result holds when these additional concerns are taken into 
consideration.  
        The analysis of decomposing Z-score reveals that firm size has a significant, negative 
impact on capital asset ratio but not on return on asset or earnings volatility. These findings 
suggest that financial firms engage in excessive risk-taking mainly through increased leverage. 
On the other hand, they also suggest that economy of scale does not exist, which is consistent 
with existing literature. Regressions with volatility of stock return as a dependent variable 
indicate that size-related diversification may not exist in the financial sector since size is 
positively associated with return volatility.  
        Second, we find that the newly developed corporate governance measure, calculated as 
median director dollar stockholding, is negatively associated with risk-taking for all risk 
measures, and they are significant at a 1% level across all specifications and estimations. Lastly, 
we find that investment banks, but not insurance companies, engage in more risk-taking 
compared to commercial banks. However, this result is not driven by leverage since investment 
banks on average are less leveraged than commercial banks. 
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        While there is a substantial literature that examines the risk-taking behavior of financial 
institutions (see Saunders, Strock and Travlos, 1990; Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan, 1997; 
Stiroh, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al, 2010; and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2011), to our knowledge, we are the first to study comprehensively the relation between size and 
risk-taking of financial institutions (see Table I for a detailed comparison of this study with 
existing literature on the risk-taking of financial institutions). The gap is surprising because the 
TBTF phenomenon is not new,7 and one might think this question would have been settled a 
long time ago. While Boyd and Runkle (1993) is the closest to this study, there are significant 
differences. First, the motivation is different. Their study is motivated by two theories related to 
banking firms – deposit insurance and modern intermediation theory – while ours is motivated 
by the political debate about capping the financial firm’s size. Secondly, the scope of their study 
is limited by focusing on only large bank holding companies (BHCs), while our sample includes 
commercial banks, investment banks and insurance companies, and they have a large variation in 
size. We argue that, since the recent financial crisis was not caused by bank holding companies 
alone, excluding these important components will not provide a complete picture about risk-
taking in the financial industry. Lastly, the inference of Boyd and Runkle (1993) is also limited 
because in their empirical test, the only explanatory variable is size, which is more like a 
univariate analysis. Ours, on the other hand, includes covariates which in theory might affect 
firm’s risk-taking. Another paper which is close to ours is Demsetz and Strahan (1997), who 
provide evidence that diversification and size are highly correlated in BHCs. Since BHC size is 
not correlated with stock return variance in many years of their sample period, they conclude that 
 
        7 The existence of TBTF policy was first admitted by federal government in 1984 when the Comptroller of the 
Currency contributed roughly $1 billion to save Continental Illinois Bank from default. See Morgan and Stiroh 
(2005). 
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size-related diversification does not translate into reductions in risk. In their regression analysis, 
however, they find that firm size has a significant effect in reducing firm-specific risk. 
 
.
 Table I 
Comparison of this research with existing literature 
Study 
Sample period 
&size Data source & screens Dependent Variable (risk) Firm Size Sign Variable of interest Other independent variables 
Sauders, Strock and  1978-1985 Call Report Standard deviation of dairly  Total asset + Insider ownership Insider ownership 
Travlos (1990) 38 Bank holding company only stock return Capital asset ratio 
Operating leverage 
Boyd and Runkle  1971-1990 Annual COMPUSTAT data Z-score Log of total asset - Size 
(1993) 122 Bank holding company only Standard deviation of ROA 
Total asset >$1 billion Equity/asset 
Require 5 consecutive years 
Demsetz and  1980-1993 Bank holding companies only Firm-specific risk (σ(ε)) Log of total asset -*** Size Capital asset ratio squared 
Strahan (1997) 134 Y-9C Report & CRSP Loan characteristics 
Trading weekds >30 
De Nicolo (2000) 1988-1998 Worldscope Z-score Log of total asset -** Size Asset growth rate 
419 Bank holding company only Volatility of ROA 
Require at least 3 year data Equity asset ratio 
ROA 
Boyd, De Nicolo  June, 2003 Small banks Z-score Log of total asset -*** Bank competition Bank Competition 
and Al Jalal (2006) 2500 Operate only in rural non- Equity asset ratio Country controls 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
Stiroh (2006) 1997-2004 Y-9C Standard deviation of weekly  Log of asset -*** Log of equity asset ratio 
400 Bank holding companies only stock return Loan & income controls 
Laeven and Levine  1996-2001 Bankscope&Bankers Almanac  Z-score Log of total asset -* Cash flow right Cash flow right 
(2009) 270 10 largest public banks in each Country controls 
country 
Houston et al (2010) 2000-2007 BankScope Z-score Log of total asset +*** Creditor right Log of total asset square 
2400 Banks only ROA Credit rights 
Cross-country study Capital asset ratio Country controls 
Volatility of ROA 
This Paper 1998-2008 Compustat & Proxy statement Z-score Log of total asset -** Size Market to book 
302 Commercial bank, investmnet Write-down Log of total avenue Governance Corporate governance 
bank and insurance Volatility of stock return CEO ownership 
Industry controls 
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        Our paper builds on the literature related to economy of scale. Berger and Mester (1997) 
estimate banking returns to scale using a U.S. bank sample for the 1990s to find an optimal 
banking size of around $25 billion in assets.  Hughes and Mester (1997) find that banks of all 
sizes enjoy significant scale economy when financial capital is considered as a mechanism for 
signaling risk to less informed investors, and that bank managers are assumed risk-averse. They 
argue that scale economy exists because as banks grow larger, they are able to economize on the 
use of financial capital, and the cost of signaling risk decreases. In line with this, Hughes, 
Mester, and Moon (2001) offer evidence that scale economies so often cited by merging banks 
do, indeed exist, but are elusive. They argue this is because these scale economies are influenced 
by banks’ risk-taking and can, in fact, be obscured by risk-taking. 
        Our study also contributes to the broader literature on governance (see Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009; and Brown and Caylor, 2006) by 
incorporating a new measure of corporate governance, namely, the median director dollar 
stockholding (see Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) and by offering empirical evidence that the new 
measure has a significant impact in reducing the risk-taking of financial institutions.  
        Our analysis is crucial from a public policy perspective because the risk-taking behavior of 
financial institutions affects financial and economic fragility, business cycle fluctuations, and 
economic growth (see Bernanke, 1983, Calomiris and Mason, 1997, 2003a, b, and Keely, 1990). 
Our findings have important policy implications that are particularly relevant today, as the calls 
for strict restrictions and reinforcement of corporate governance on financial sector accelerate.8 
First, they suggest that instead of capping the firm size, it is more effective for regulators to 
strengthen and enhance regulations on capital requirements for all FIs. Secondly, our finding on 
 
        8 See The Art and Science of Risk Management, 2009 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Report. 
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corporate governance indicates that median director dollar stockholding can be used as an 
effective internal corporate risk control mechanism. Our last finding provides justification for the 
functional separation of investment banking from wholesale financial services, as pointed out by 
Walter (2009). 
        The paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the existing literature and 
develop the hypotheses. Chapter 3 summarizes the data. Chapter 4 presents core results. Chapter 
5 compares the marginal effect of size on risk-taking between TBTF firms and non-TBTF firms. 
Chapter 6 concludes with policy implications. 
CHAPTER 2 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
        The recent financial crisis has generated tremendous interest in the study of risk-taking of 
financial institutions (FIs). A variety of issues have been considered by researchers. For instance, 
in a cross county study, Laeven and Levine (2009) analyze the relation between bank risk-taking, 
bank governance (measured by cash flow rights), and national bank regulations. Specifically, 
they investigate how governance and national regulations jointly shape the risk-taking behavior 
of individual banks. Based on a sample of the largest 279 banks in 48 countries, they find that 
cash flow right plays a critical role in shaping banks’ risk-taking to the extent that the actual sign 
of the effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. Beltratti and Stulz (2010) 
exploit variation in the cross-section of performance of large banks across the world during the 
period of the financial turmoil. They document that banks with dispersed ownership have lower 
idiosyncratic risk, and that banks with more non-interest income are associated with higher 
idiosyncratic risk. Based on a U.S. sample of FIs, Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) 
investigate whether compensation structure contributes to excessive risk-taking. They find that 
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risk-taking, measured as firm beta, return volatility, etc., are correlated with short-term pay such 
as options and options. Their main result suggests that, besides the greediness of management, 
investors’ short-termism may also have contributed to the crisis by encouraging management to 
engage in excessive risk-taking.  In a similar context, Balachandran, Kogut, and Harnal (2010) 
find that equity-based pay such as restricted stock and options increases the probability of default 
of financial institutions, while non-equity pay such as cash bonuses decreases it. Lastly, Bolton, 
Mehran, and Shapiro (2010) propose addressing the excessive risk-taking by tying executive 
compensation to both stock and debt prices. 
        We focus on size-related risk distortion in this study; we construct a few hypotheses drawn 
from the moral hazard and risk-taking literature. This first is the view of moral hazard in 
financial firms due to the TBTF policies. Moral hazard is a concept that refers to the distortion of 
incentives caused by insurance; it occurs when a party insulated from risk may behave 
differently than it would if it were fully exposed to the risk. In banking, this distortion of 
behavior may happen for a variety of reasons, such as protection of bank creditors provided by 
the Discount Window, Deposit Insurance, and especially the TBTF policy. With the government 
safety net in place, the downside risks of FIs are limited: TBTF firms know they will be bailed 
out by passing their losses to the government and taxpayers when their bets go sour while 
keeping all the profits when gambles succeed. Since firm size is positively correlated with the 
likelihood of being TBTF, it follows that, as firms become larger, they are more likely to engage 
in excessive risk-taking. This strand of literature includes Boyd and Runkle (1993), Boyd, 
Jagannathan and Kwak (2009), and Walter (2009), to name just a few. 
        The role of corporate governance in coping with risk is not obvious. Standard theory on 
corporate governance predicts that firms with better governance increase firm value by adopting 
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projects with positive net present value (NPV).9 However, it does not preclude the possibility of 
projects with risky cash flows. Therefore, it might be in the interest of shareholders to take risky 
projects as long as they are value-enhancing. In addition, option theory (Black and Scholes, 
1973) tells us that, all else being equal, the value of option increases with volatility of the 
underlying asset. Since a company’s shareholders are essentially holding a European call option 
with the total value of the company as the underlying asset, and the value of debt as the striking 
price (assuming the firm has risky debt), it follows that the more volatile the company’s cash 
flow is, the more valuable the call option is. Thus, the value of common stock increases. Based 
on these arguments, we would expect a positive association between corporate governance and 
risk-taking. 
        This relation, however, can go in the opposite direction. As Rajan (2006) and Diamond and 
Rajan (2009) pointed out, the compensation structure is different in the finance industry in that 
the performance of CEOs is evaluated based in part on the earnings they generate relative to their 
peers. With this pressure, executives have incentives to take excessive risk to profit in the short 
run even if they are not truly value-maximizing — a term coined “short-termism” in banking 
literature (see Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman, 2010). As noted in Diamond and Rajan (2009), 
“even if managers recognize that this type of strategy is not truly value-creating, a desire to 
pump up their stock prices and their personal reputations may nevertheless make it the most 
attractive option for them”(p.607).  If these researchers are right, we would expect FIs with better 
governance to have set incentives and controls to avoid taking risks that did not benefit 
shareholders. Thus, we should see a negative relation between corporate governance and risk-
 
        9 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) provide evidence that firms with better governance have higher firm 
value; Bhagat and Bolton (2008) have similar findings. 
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taking.10 We argue that Diamond and Rajan (2009) is more relevant to our study since it is 
specifically tailored to financial institutions; we expect a negative association between corporate 
governance and risk-taking. 
        The third hypothesis is based on the fact that commercial banks and insurance companies 
have relatively stricter regulations compared to investment banks, so we expect the risk-taking of 
commercial banks and insurance companies to be more constrained. The last one is motivated by 
the proposed differential treatment of big vs. small firms, and it extends the first hypothesis and 
argues that firms in different size cohorts behave differently. These hypotheses are summarized 
as the following: 
H1. On average, bigger FIs are riskier than small FIs. The exact size beyond which government 
will bail out the troubled firm is unknown, but generally we expect the likelihood of government 
rescue is bigger for large FIs than for small FIs. 
H2. The effect of corporate governance on firm risk-taking is negative. 
H3. Investment banks are riskier than commercial banks are. 
H4. Conditional on whether a FI is TBTF firm, the marginal effect of size on risk is higher for 
systemic important firms than non-systemic firms.  
CHAPTER 3 
Sample collection and variable construction 
        Our main sources of data are Compustat, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 
RiskMetrics, and Bloomberg supplemented by hand-collected data from companies’ SEC filings 
 
        10 Indeed, as argued by John, Litov, and Yeung (2008), the relationship between corporate governance and 
risk‐taking could be either positive or negative. 
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on EDGAR. We define financial industry as all financial institutions consisting of commercial 
banks, investment banks, and life insurance companies,11 as classified by their 4-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC). Specifically, firms with the 4-digit SIC codes of 6020, 6211 and 
6311 are identified as commercial banks, investment banks and life insurance companies, 
respectively. 12  We use this narrower classification on the grounds that it greatly reduces 
unobservable heterogeneity among firms within each category, thus it alleviates omitted variable 
bias and enhances comparability.  
        The starting point for the sample selection is the Compustat, where we collect annual 
accounting data on all U.S. commercial banks, investment banks and life insurance. Our sample 
spans the period 1998—2008. Following Boyd and Runkle (1993) and John, Litov and Yeung 
(2008), we require that firms have at least five years of data on key accounting variables over the 
period to be included in the sample. This process yields an initial sample of 687 unique financial 
institutions or an unbalanced panel of 6180 firm-year observations, comprising 587 commercial 
banks, 59 investment banks, and 41 life insurance companies.  
        Our study requires governance and CEO ownership data. This data is available through 
RiskMetrics. However, RiskMetrics only provides data for S&P 1500 companies, which includes 
around 10% of financial firms. After matching our initial sample with this database, we lost the 
majority of our observations. For this reason, we hand-collected data on governance and 
ownership from each company’s proxy statement. However, extracting data on all 687 firms is 
labor intensive, so we limit our investigation to a random sample of 250 commercial banks, 
while keeping all the investment banks and life insurance companies from the original sample. 
 
        11 We would like to include mortgage companies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in our sample, but the 
observations for these firms are too small to make a reliable inference. 
        12 This classification is similar to Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) 
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The advantage of the sampling process is that it avoids the estimation problem of selection on 
observables (size) since firms in the S&P 1500 are relatively large. We then match this random 
sample to CRSP to retrieve the stock return data in order to calculate stock return volatility.       
        We use accounting write-down as one of our risk-taking measures. The description of write-
down is provided in the following section. We obtain most of this data from companies’ 10-K 
and 10-Q during the years 2007 and 2008 while the rest comes from Bloomberg13 using the 
WDCI function. To be consistent with Bloomberg, we search each company’s filings using key 
words such as write-down/off, provision for credit losses, charge-off, impairments, and so on.  
        Our final sample has a total of 302 observations with available data, consisting of 238 
commercial banks, 38 investment banks and 26 life insurance companies. In our sample, 
insurance companies include firms such as AIG, Prudential Financial Inc, and Lincoln National 
Corp, while investment banks include Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs. 
A. Definition of variables 
A1. Risk-taking 
        Our primary measure for firm risk-taking is the Z-score, which equals the average return on 
assets (ROA) plus the capital asset ratio (CAR) divided by the standard deviation of asset returns 
(σ(ROA)) (see Appendix A for the theoretical development of variable).  
        In banking, the definition of capital is different from non-banking firms and it varies 
depending on the level of reliability as a cushion against losses and financial distress. According 
to Basel I Accord, for example, Tier 1 capital consists primarily of common stock and retained 
 
        13 Bloomberg started to collect write‐down data for financial institutions from the 3rd quarter of 2007. While 
companies did take write‐downs in the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2007, the magnitude is relatively small. 
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earnings, while Tier 2 capital is composed of supplementary capital, which is categorized as 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid instruments and 
subordinated term debt14.  In this research, we calculate CAR as total asset minus total liability 
divided by total asset, following Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston et al (2010), Balachandran, 
Kogut and Harnal (2010), and Vyas (2011). 
        Z-score has been widely used in the recent literature as a measure of bank risk. The Z-score 
measures the distance from insolvency. A higher value of Z-score indicates more stability. Since 
the Z-score is highly skewed, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al (2010), and 
use the natural logarithm of the Z-score as the risk measure. However, the problem with this 
transformation is that it is not defined when you have non-positive Z-scores, which renders some 
loss of observations. Due to this reason, we rely on raw Z-score as our primary measure for risk-
taking while taking into account the skewness of the distribution as we perform the regression 
analysis, and use the logarithm of Z-score as a robustness check. We use the sample to estimate 
the population average ROA and σ(ROA). Specifically, ROA and CAR are calculated as the 
average over 1998—2008 using annual data, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of annual 
ROA over 1998—2008.  
        As a robustness check, we incorporate additional risk-taking measures including market 
betas, a measure that captures a firm’s non-diversifiable risk, accounting based write-downs15 
that reflect a CEO’s risk-taking incentives, and the standard deviation of annual stock return 
which indicates the market’s perception about firms’ risk-taking. For each firm, we calculate 
market beta as the average CAPM betas for 60-month rolling regressions over the sample period. 
 
        14 See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1 for source and Appendix B for illustration. 
        15 See Chesney, Stromberg and Wagner (2010) for a detailed description about the advantages and 
disadvantages of this variable. 
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As for write-down, we follow Vyas (2011) and define it as net credit losses recognized by 
financial institutions through accounting treatments, which include fair value adjustments, 
impairment charges, loan loss provisions, and charge-offs. We focus on total write-downs that 
occurred during the commonly-agreed crisis period of 2007 and 2008 because it is this period 
that exposes the investments undertaken by banks in prior years to the bad state of the world. For 
equity volatility, we use both annual and monthly stock return data.  
        To gain insights about which component of the Z-score is principally driving the 
relationship between the independent variables (e.g., size, ownership, and corporate governance) 
and Z-score, we use the three components of Z-score (i.e., ROA, CAR, and σ(ROA)) as separate 
dependent variables.  
A2. Firm size 
        The potential candidates for measuring firm size include accounting-based measures such as 
total asset and total revenue, and market based measures such as market capitalization. We prefer 
total asset and total revenue to market capitalization because previous literature argues these two 
accounting measures are less noisy as a proxy for the “scale” of the firm than market measure 
(see Baker and Hall, 2004).16 Following the existing literature, we focus primarily on total asset 
and use total revenue as a robustness check. We apply logarithm transformation on both the 
average total asset and average total revenue over the sample period 1998—2008. We expect the 
effect of this variable on risk taking to be positive. 
A3. Corporate governance 
 
16Nevertheless, we also tried total market capitalization as measure for firm size in an unreported regression. The 
results are qualitatively the same as our primary size measures, and are available from the authors upon request. 
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        The commonly used governance measures are G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), 
E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2004), and Gov-Score (Brown and Caylor, 2006). 
Though these governance indices are widely used in empirical research, such use has both 
strengths and weaknesses. In particular, recent studies (e.g., Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano, 2008; 
Bhagat, and Bolton, 2008) have questioned whether governance indices measure the right 
governance attributes. As such, we employ a new measure of corporate governance – the median 
director dollar stockholding – developed by Bhagat and Bolton (2008). The advantage of this 
measure is that it is simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement errors and can enhance the 
comparability of research findings.17 As mentioned earlier, RiskMetrics provide limited data on 
financial firms (123 out of 302 observations), so we supplement it by hand-collecting director 
ownership information, as of the last year in our sample period, from companies’ proxy 
statements. We then calculate the natural logarithm of median director dollar stockholding by 
matching this data to stock price information obtained from CRSP. 
A4. CEO stock ownership 
        Following Bhagat and Bolton (2008), we use CEO ownership as our measure for bank 
ownership structure. Like the governance variable, we hand-collect CEO ownership data in 
addition to the data provided by RiskMetrics, as of the last year in our sample period, from 
companies’ proxy statement.  Since ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable over time, we 
do not view this as a serious shortcoming. 
        Risk-averse managers, whose employment income is tied to changes in firm value, have 
incentives to take on less than optimal firm risk to protect their firm-specific human capital. This 
 
        17 See Bhagat and Bolton (2008) for a detailed description and Bhagat and Bolton (2010) for the strength about 
this variable. 
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is an agency problem in essence as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976), Amihud and Lev 
(1981), and Smith and Stulz (1985). However, ownership by managers may be used to induce 
them to act in a manner that is consistent with the interest of shareholders. Thus, we would 
expect to see a positive relation between CEO ownership and risk-taking.  
        Researchers have documented the impact of ownership structure on firm risk-taking. For 
instance, analyzing nonfinancial firms, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find a positive relation 
between security holdings of managers and the changes in firm variance, while John, Litov, and 
Yeung (2008) find that managers enjoying large private benefits of control select suboptimally 
conservative investment strategies. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) find the stockholder 
controlled banks exhibit higher risk taking behavior than managerially controlled banks. A recent 
study by Laeven and Levine (2009) considers the potential conflicts between managers and 
owners and analyzes the relations between the risk-taking of banks, their ownership structures, 
and bank regulations. They find that bank risk is generally higher in banks that have controlling 
shareholders. 
A5. Market-to-book ratio 
        Market-to-book asset ratio, has been identified an important risk factor in the asset pricing 
literature. For instance, Fama and French (1992) point out that firms with high ratios of book-to-
market value (or low market-to-book) are more likely to be in financial distress. We compute this 
variable by averaging each firm’s year-end market-to-book asset ratio over the sample period. 
        In the banking literature, this variable has often been used as a proxy for bank charter value 
(see Demsetz, Saindenberg and Strahan 1997; Goyal 2005). A charter has value because of 
barriers to entry into the industry and usually it is defined as the discounted stream of future 
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profits that a bank is expected to earn from its access to protected markets.18 Since loss of charter 
imposes substantial costs, it is argued that charter value can incentivize banks to adopt prudent 
decision-making——the so-called charter-value hypothesis (see Keeley, 1990; Carletti and 
Hartmann, 2003). Empirical models of bank risk have focused on this disciplinary role of charter 
value. Based on a sample of 367 bank holding companies from 1991—1995, for instance, 
Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997) found that charter value is negatively associated with 
bank risk-taking. Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997) also found that banks with low charter value 
assumed significantly more risk.  
A6. Other controls   
         We use average annual return on asset as a control for firms’ profitability and debt/asset 
ratio as a control for firms’ leverage. We expect a negative association between profitability and 
risk-taking, and positive association between risk-taking and leverage. In addition, we use firm 
age to control for firm experience, and we expect that experienced firms are better at handling 
risk than less-experienced firms, ceteris paribus. 
B. Summary statistics 
        Table II presents the summary statistics for all key variables. The variable definitions and 
the data sources are described in Appendix C. In this table, I also separate the sample into three 
subsamples according to their classification for easy comparison. Summary statistics in Table II 
shows that the Z-score has a mean of 34 and a standard deviation of 31. This fairly high standard 
deviation and the wide range in Z-scores suggest a considerable cross-sectional variation in the 
level of firm risk. Further, since the average Z-score is greater than its median, we know it has a 
 
        18 See Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) for a description of this variable. 
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right-skewed distribution.  Also noticeable is that investment banks have the lowest average Z-
score followed by commercial banks, and insurance companies have the highest Z-score. Since 
higher Z-score means more stability, it seems that investment banks are riskier than their peers, 
which holds up to our initial conjecture (this is later confirmed in our regression analysis).   
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Table II 
Summary statistics.  
      This table reports summary statistics of the main regression variables for all financial institutions (Panel A), commercial banks (Panel 
B), investment banks (Panel C) and life insurance (Panel D). SIC codes 6020, 6211 and 6311 are used to define commercial banks, 
investment banks and life insurance, respectively. Sample consists of 258 commercial banks, 38 investment banks and 26 life insurance 
companies. Statistics based on average annual data over 1998-2008, unless otherwise indicated. Z-score is firm’s return on assets plus the 
capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset return over period 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the volatility of the firm’s return on 
assets over the period 1998-2008. Equity volatility is standard deviation of annual stock return over 1998-2008. Size is the book total 
asset (millions). Market-to-book is calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book total asset. ROA is the 
return on asset. Leverage is the debt asset ratio. Director ownership ($) is median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our 
sample period (thousands). Director ownership (%) is median director percentage stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. 
CEO ownership (%) is percentage of CEO stock ownership as of the last year in our sample period. Firm age is proxied by the difference 
between 2008 and the year that the firm first appears in Compustat monthly stock return database. 
Panel A: all financial institutions                
variable  mean  median  Standard Deviation  min  max  N 
Z‐score  34.08  25.29  30.82  ‐0.29  203.14  302 
ln(Z‐score)  3.10  3.24  1.08  ‐4.09  5.28  300 
σ(ROA)  0.02  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.61  302 
equity volatility  0.36  0.30  0.25  0.08  2.30  302 
size  32,777  2,240  116,119  12  1,027,891  302 
ln(size)  7.98  7.71  2.11  2.50  13.84  302 
CAR  0.13  0.09  0.14  0.03  0.86  302 
market‐to‐book  1.16  1.07  0.43  0.76  4.76  302 
ROA  0.01  0.01  0.05  ‐0.41  0.56  302 
leverage  0.87  0.91  0.14  0.14  0.97  302 
director ownership ($)  1,626  891  2,205  11  14,364  300 
ln(director ownership)  13.63  13.70  1.24  9.28  16.48  300 
director ownership (%)  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.05  302 
CEO ownership (%)  0.04  0.01  0.10  0.00  0.89  302 
firm age  19.01  15.00  11.59  2.00  46.00  302 
Panel B: commercial banks                
variable  mean  median  Standard Deviation  min  max  N 
Z‐score  38.30  30.70  32.12  2.00  203.14  238 
ln(Z‐score)  3.28  3.42  0.94  0.69  5.28  238 
σ(ROA)  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.07  238 
equity volatility  0.31  0.29  0.14  0.08  0.92  238 
size  24,352  2,112  104,774  79  1,027,891  238 
ln(size)  7.92  7.66  1.83  4.37  13.84  238 
CAR  0.09  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.23  238 
market‐to‐book  1.08  1.07  0.06  0.98  1.48  238 
ROA  0.01  0.01  0.01  ‐0.03  0.04  238 
leverage  0.91  0.91  0.02  0.77  0.95  238 
director ownership ($)  1,721  929  2,254  11  14,364  238 
ln(director ownership)  13.74  13.74  1.16  9.28  16.48  238 
director ownership (%)  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.05  238 
CEO ownership (%)  0.03  0.01  0.06  0.00  0.53  238 
firm age  19.63  15.50  11.38  2.00  46.00  238 
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Table II. (continued) 
Penal C: investment banks                
variable  mean  median  Standard Deviation  min  max  N 
Z‐score  10.21  8.35  9.04  ‐0.29  39.66  38 
ln(Z‐score)  1.90  2.15  1.36  ‐4.09  3.68  36 
σ(ROA)  0.12  0.06  0.16  0.00  0.61  38 
equity volatility  0.67  0.46  0.50  0.23  2.30  38 
size  52,361  689  146,691  12  656,829  38 
ln(size)  7.21  6.53  2.95  2.50  13.40  38 
CAR  0.37  0.34  0.28  0.03  0.86  38 
market‐to‐book  1.73  1.26  1.03  0.76  4.76  38 
ROA  ‐0.01  0.01  0.15  ‐0.41  0.56  38 
leverage  0.63  0.66  0.28  0.14  0.97  38 
director ownership ($)  1,174  626  1,626  29  9,069  38 
ln(director ownership)  13.23  13.35  1.34  10.29  16.02  38 
director ownership (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  38 
CEO ownership (%)  0.14  0.03  0.23  0.00  0.89  38 
firm age  14.68  11.50  10.00  2.00  44.00  38 
Panel D: life insurance                   
variable  mean  median  Standard Deviation  min  max  N 
Z‐score  30.28  24.71  22.08  2.94  96.98  26 
ln(Z‐score)  3.18  3.21  0.73  1.08  4.57  26 
σ(ROA)  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.04  26 
equity volatility  0.32  0.31  0.11  0.11  0.64  26 
size  81,275  15,824  150,747  78  641,511  26 
ln(size)  9.65  9.66  2.22  4.36  13.37  26 
CAR  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.26  26 
market‐to‐book  1.03  1.01  0.09  0.88  1.32  26 
ROA  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.03  26 
leverage  0.88  0.90  0.07  0.74  0.97  26 
director ownership ($)  1,396  615  2,474  14  12,096  24 
ln(director ownership)  13.12  13.33  1.63  9.56  16.31  24 
director ownership (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  26 
CEO ownership (%)  0.03  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.26  26 
firm age  19.73  15.00  14.42  4.00  46.00  26 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II (continued) 
small = total assets < 1 billion($); middle = total asset ≥ 1 billion & ≤ 10 billion; large = total assets > 10 billions 
               All financial institutions                  
                             
 
   small middle Large
variable  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N 
Z‐score  34.75  27.03  35.63  107  35.75  29.14  31.03  117  30.64  24.49  22.33  78 
ln(Z‐score)  2.94  3.35  1.38  105  3.21  3.37  0.92  117  3.17  3.20  0.75  78 
σ(ROA)  0.05  0.00  0.11  107  0.01  0.00  0.02  117  0.01  0.00  0.01  78 
equity volatility  0.42  0.32  0.35  107  0.33  0.30  0.16  117  0.31  0.27  0.15  78 
size  468  453  249  107  3,682  2,890  2,357  117  120,741  37,856  205,245  78 
ln(size)  5.90  6.12  0.90  107  8.01  7.97  0.64  117  10.79  10.54  1.27  78 
CAR  0.19  0.10  0.21  107  0.11  0.09  0.07  117  0.09  0.09  0.03  78 
market‐to‐book  1.26  1.05  0.69  107  1.09  1.08  0.11  117  1.11  1.09  0.11  78 
ROA  0.00  0.01  0.09  107  0.01  0.01  0.01  117  0.01  0.01  0.01  78 
leverage  0.81  0.90  0.21  107  0.89  0.91  0.07  117  0.91  0.91  0.03  78 
director ownership ($)  948  574  1,116  106  1,728  922  2,189  117  2,403  1,340  2,970  77 
ln(director ownership)  13.10  13.26  1.29  106  13.78  13.73  1.07  117  14.12  14.11  1.14  77 
director ownership (%)  0.01  0.01  0.01  107  0.00  0.00  0.01  117  0.00  0.00  0.00  78 
CEO ownership (%)  0.07  0.02  0.15  107  0.04  0.01  0.07  117  0.01  0.01  0.03  78 
firm age  12.34  11.00  6.39  107         17.96  18.00  7.67  117 29.76  27.50  14.12  78 
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               Commercial banks                      
small  middle  large 
variable  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N 
Z‐score  41.77  33.65  36.75  81  37.98  30.80  31.82  105  33.53  24.68  23.86  52 
ln(Z‐score)  3.27  3.52  1.09  81  3.29  3.43  0.91  105  3.27  3.21  0.73  52 
σ(ROA)  0.01  0.00  0.01  81  0.01  0.00  0.01  105  0.00  0.00  0.00  52 
equity volatility  0.32  0.30  0.13  81  0.33  0.30  0.15  105  0.26  0.25  0.10  52 
size  497  465  226  81  3,583  2,843  2,282  105  103,450  35,901  206,958  52 
ln(size)  6.09  6.14  0.53  81  7.99  7.95  0.63  105  10.65  10.49  1.18  52 
CAR  0.10  0.09  0.03  81  0.09  0.09  0.02  105  0.09  0.09  0.02  52 
market‐to‐book  1.05  1.04  0.04  81  1.08  1.08  0.05  105  1.13  1.11  0.09  52 
ROA  0.01  0.01  0.01  81  0.01  0.01  0.01  105  0.01  0.01  0.00  52 
leverage  0.90  0.91  0.03  81  0.91  0.91  0.02  105  0.91  0.91  0.02  52 
director ownership ($)  1,009  669  1,156  81  1,824  924  2,280  105  2,622  1,435  3,043  52 
ln(director ownership)  13.24  13.41  1.20  81  13.84  13.74  1.07  105  14.33  14.18  0.93  52 
director ownership (%)  0.01  0.01  0.01  81  0.00  0.00  0.01  105  0.00  0.00  0.00  52 
CEO ownership (%)  0.04  0.02  0.07  81  0.03  0.01  0.07  105  0.01  0.01  0.02  52 
firm age  11.98  12.00  4.80  81         17.80  17.00  7.46  105 35.23  38.00  10.19  52 
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               Investment banks                      
small  middle  large 
variable  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N 
Z‐score  6.37  5.16  5.51  21  13.63  9.79  12.10  8  16.14  14.27  9.14  9 
ln(Z‐score)  1.38  1.90  1.59  19  2.31  2.24  0.82  8  2.61  2.66  0.64  9 
σ(ROA)  0.20  0.12  0.18  21  0.05  0.04  0.05  8  0.01  0.00  0.01  9 
equity volatility  0.83  0.61  0.60  21  0.47  0.37  0.28  8  0.51  0.42  0.27  9 
size  322  329  264  21  3,528  2,371  2,491  8  217,194  96,783  243,837  9 
ln(size)  5.11  5.80  1.47  21  7.99  7.77  0.60  8  11.41  11.48  1.60  9 
CAR  0.53  0.50  0.26  21  0.30  0.34  0.15  8  0.07  0.08  0.03  9 
market‐to‐book  2.14  1.90  1.23  21  1.27  1.16  0.35  8  1.17  1.07  0.19  9 
ROA   
         
‐ ‐0.02 0.02 0.21  21  0.02  0.01  0.03  8  0.01  0.01  0.01  9 
leverage  0.47  0.50  0.26  21  0.70  0.66  0.15  8  0.93  0.92  0.03  9 
director ownership ($)  856  413  1,027  21  716  547  545  8  2,322  1,528  2,714  9 
ln(director ownership)  12.89  12.93  1.39  21  13.17  13.20  0.90  8  14.07  14.24  1.29  9 
director ownership (%)  0.00  0.00  0.01  21  0.00  0.00  0.00  8  0.00  0.00  0.00  9 
CEO ownership (%)  0.22  0.06  0.28  21  0.06  0.01  0.08  8  0.04  0.02  0.06  9 
firm age  12.29  10.00  9.90  21 20.00  18.50  11.58  8 15.56  14.00  7.52  9 
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          Insurance companies  
small  middle  large 
variable  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N  mean  median  sd  N 
Z‐score  40.18  27.03  34.97  5  21.31  21.41  6.39  4  29.49  25.48  19.92  17 
ln(Z‐score)  3.38  3.30  0.89  5  3.02  3.06  0.32  4  3.16  3.24  0.77  17 
σ(ROA)  0.01  0.00  0.01  5  0.01  0.01  0.00  4  0.01  0.00  0.01  17 
equity volatility  0.29  0.27  0.07  5  0.24  0.28  0.09  4  0.34  0.33  0.12  17 
size  616  749  341  5  6,601  6,371  2,842  4  122,568  30,199  173,973  17 
ln(size)  6.15  6.62  1.03  5  8.72  8.71  0.45  4  10.90  10.32  1.31  17 
CAR  0.20  0.21  0.06  5  0.12  0.12  0.04  4  0.10  0.07  0.06  17 
market‐to‐book  1.04  1.02  0.18  5  1.02  1.00  0.04  4  1.03  1.02  0.07  17 
ROA  0.01  0.01  0.00  5  0.01  0.01  0.00  4  0.01  0.01  0.01  17 
leverage  0.80  0.79  0.06  5  0.88  0.88  0.04  4  0.90  0.93  0.06  17 
director ownership ($)  203  116  254  4  1,228  1,315  1,042  4  1,736  763  2,940  16 
ln(director ownership)  11.39  11.38  1.64  4  13.52  13.89  1.36  4  13.45  13.54  1.49  16 
director ownership (%)  0.00  0.00  0.00  5  0.00  0.00  0.00  4  0.00  0.00  0.00  17 
CEO ownership (%)  0.02  0.01  0.04  5  0.11  0.09  0.13  4  0.01  0.00  0.01  17 
firm age  18.40  21.00  9.24  5         18.00  19.50  4.24  4 20.53  11.00  17.27  17 
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        The other measures of risk, such as volatility of equity return, also indicate the same pattern. 
In terms of leverage, commercial banks are the highest, followed by insurance and investment 
banks. This result is a little surprising considering the fact that the biggest investment banks are 
also the most leveraged firms among financial institutions. In our sample, investment banks take 
four places in the top six most highly leveraged firms (see Appendix D). We see this result 
because most middle and small sized investment banks do not have this high leverage, which 
significantly drives down the average leverage. Lastly, the summary statistics for Z-score are 
similar to those reported by Houston et al (2010), as they report a mean log Z-score of 3.240 and 
a standard deviation of 1.086, while we have 3.103 and 1.075, respectively. 
        The average financial institution has $33 billion in assets with a standard deviation of $116 
billion, and it ranges from a minimum of $12 million to a maximum of $1 trillion. The huge 
standard deviation and range indicate a significant variation in firm size. Examination of the size 
distributions by different categories indicates a common pattern: in each category, there are a 
few very large companies with the rest being small and middle sized. For example, out of 238 
commercial banks, only 11 have assets over $100 billion. This pattern is also demonstrated by 
Figure 1, which shows the histograms for all firms, along with firms in their separate categories. 
In addition, insurance companies have the highest average size, followed by investment banks 
and commercial banks. Due to the highly skewed distribution of size, the natural logarithm 
transformation is applied to this variable.  
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Figure 1 
Histogram of firm size (in billion dollars) 
 
        The governance variable, measured as the natural logarithm of median director dollar 
stockholding, has a mean of 13.63 and standard deviation of 1.24 and it ranges from a minimum 
of 9.28 to a maximum of 16.48. The distribution of this variable is similar across categories. 
Lastly, the sample shows an average firm age of 19 years, with investment banks significantly 
younger than commercial banks and insurance companies.  
        Table III presents the correlation among the key variables. First of all, as expected, all three 
risk measures are highly correlated. Secondly, the log of firm size is significantly correlated with 
risk as measured by the log(Z-score), volatility of return on asset and equity return, but not raw 
Z-score. Firm age is negatively correlated with risk, consistent with our initial conjecture that all 
else being equal, older firms have more experience in risk management. Interestingly, we found 
that more stable FIs are associated with a lower market-to-book ratio, which is inconsistent with 
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the finding in Demsetz, Saindenberg and Strahan (1996). In addition, the governance variable is 
highly correlated with risk as measured by Z-score and volatility of return on assets, but not the 
equity volatility. Lastly, CEO ownership is positively correlated with all three risk measures, 
indicating that stock ownership by CEO induces risk-taking. 
 
 
Table III 
Correlation matrix of main regression variables.  
      This table reports the correlations between the main regression variables. Sample consists of 302 financial institutions. Statistics based on averages of annual data over the period 1998-2008, unless 
otherwise indicated. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA). σ(ROA) is the volatility of the firm’s return on assets over the period 1998-2008. Equity volatility is standard deviation of annual stock return over 
1998-2008. Size is the total asset (in $ millions). ln(rev) is log of total revenue (in $ millions). Market-to-book is calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book total asset. 
ROA is the return on asset. Leverage is the debt asset ratio. Director ownership ($) is natural logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. CEO ownership (%) 
is percentage of CEO stock ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock 
return database. p-values denoting the significance level of each correlation coefficients are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 z_score  ln(Z‐score) σ(ROA) 
equity 
volatility  size  ln(size)  ln(rev) 
Market‐to‐
book  ROA  leverage 
director 
ownership 
CEO 
ownership 
ln(Z‐score)  0.807*** 
(0.000) 
σ(ROA)   
   
   
     
     
     
   
     
   
               
       
‐0.271*** ‐0.597*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
equity ‐0.329*** ‐0.531***  0.554*** 
volatility  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
size ‐0.098* ‐0.034  ‐0.059  ‐0.038 
(0.090)  (0.555)  (0.309) (0.517)
ln(size) ‐0.053  0.106* ‐0.309*** ‐0.256***  0.588*** 
(0.358)  (0.067)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(rev) ‐0.141** ‐0.018  ‐0.111* ‐0.093  0.590***  0.950*** 
(0.014)  (0.760)  (0.055) (0.107) (0.000) (0.000)
market‐to‐  ‐0.168*** ‐0.250***  0.564***  0.349*** ‐0.048 ‐0.159***  0.024 
book  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.411)  (0.006)  (0.681) 
ROA  0.083  0.236*** ‐0.278*** ‐0.370***  0.010  0.148**  0.100*  0.275*** 
(0.149)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.857)  (0.010)  (0.084)  (0.000) 
leverage  0.207***  0.370*** ‐0.545*** ‐0.305***  0.108*  0.369***  0.141** ‐0.573***  0.036 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.534)
director  0.181***  0.215*** ‐0.116** ‐0.085  0.132**  0.320***  0.280***  0.031  0.150***  0.214*** 
ownership  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.044)  (0.142)  (0.022)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.590)  (0.009)  (0.000) 
CEO ‐0.144** ‐0.221***  0.200***  0.295*** ‐0.095* ‐0.302*** ‐0.170***  0.334*** ‐0.073 ‐0.525*** ‐0.159*** 
ownership  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.099)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.208)  (0.000)  (0.006) 
Age  0.021  0.116** ‐0.183*** ‐0.238***  0.301***  0.559***  0.563*** ‐0.081  0.063  0.113**  0.158*** ‐0.066 
(0.722)  (0.044)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.160) (0.274) (0.049) (0.006) (0.251)
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i i
CHAPTER 4 
Size and firm risk 
A. Baseline regression 
        The premise of the paper is that size has a positive effect on a firm’s risk taking due to the 
moral hazard associated with the TBTF policy.  The primary measure of risk-taking is the Z-
score with a higher Z-score indicating more stability. We began by examining whether larger 
size is associated with greater risk as suggested by Boyd, Jagannathan and Kwak (2009). For 
brevity, we use label ‘size’ in referring to the natural logarithm of size in the remainder of the 
paper. In Chapter 5, we extend the analysis by testing whether systematically important firms 
behave differently from smaller ones. 
        More formally, our baseline model is as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i iz size mb dir own age ibk insα α α α α α α α= + + + + + + + +ε
                                                           
19              (1) 
where  is the Z-score of firm i, is log of average total asset of firm i, is market-to-
book asset ratio of firm i computed as the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided 
by book value of total asset, which is then averaged over 1998—2008. is the governance 
variable, computed as the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding of firm i as of the last 
year in our sample period, is the percentage of CEO ownership of firm i as of the last year 
in our sample period, is the firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year 
that the firm first appears in the Compustat monthly stock return database.  is a dummy 
iz isize imb
iibk
idir
iown
iage
 
        19 Implicit in this specification is that we assume that relation between size and risk is linear and the effect of 
size on risk‐taking is constant. Quadratic form on variable size has been used in some studies (i.e. Houston et al, 
2010), however, we prefer the linear specification because a simple t‐test in an unreported regression fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on variable size‐squared equals zero when quadratic form is used. 
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variable, which equals one if firm i is an investment bank and 0 otherwise, is a dummy 
variable for an insurance company, and is defined analogously. 
iins
iε is the error term and sβ
(s=1…6) are vectors of coefficient estimates. Note that we only include leverage and profitability 
as controls in specifications when other risk-taking measures are used as the dependent variable 
because the Z-score is a deterministic function of these two variables.  
        The discrepancies in the level of significance and signs on the variable Z-score and its log 
transformation ln(Z-score) from correlation Table III raises concerns about the existence of 
outliers.  In regression analysis, the presence of outliers can strongly distort the classical least 
squares estimator and lead to unreliable results. To investigate whether this is the case, we 
perform a series of standard diagnostics such as Cook's D influence statistic and studentized 
residuals. Results from these analyses indicate unusual points in our data. Figure 2 also presents 
the leverage-versus-squared residuals plot by running four separate OLS regressions in Eq (1), 
with Z-score, ln(Z-score), earnings volatility, and equity volatility as the respective dependent 
variables. The points far away from the mass of points indicate unusual observations.20 Figure 2 
suggests that outliers exist in our sample regardless of which risk measures are used.  
 
 
 
 
         
                                                            
        20 Appendix E shows some outliers in my sample. They have been manually verified to be accurate. 
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Figure 2 
Plot of leverage versus squared-residuals. 
      This figure is generated by running four separate OLS regressions, with Z-score, log of Z-score, log of 
earnings volatility, and log of equity volatility as respective dependent variables (Eq.1). Leverage on the 
y-axis measures how far an independent variable deviates from its mean. Normalized residual square on 
x-axis indicates outliers.  Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
        The simple diagnostic analysis precludes us from relying on the standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression for inference. The common ways to deal with outliers are truncation or 
winsorization; we opt out of these approaches for two reasons: first, we verify that those outliers 
are not data entry errors; second, the total observations in our sample are rather limited. Instead, 
we rely on two other approaches to address this issue: median and robust regression.21 
 
        21 Median regression, focusing on the 0.5 quantile, is a special case of quantile regression.  The difference 
between median and OLS regression is that OLS minimizes the squared error loss, while as median regression 
minimizes the absolute error loss. Median regression is more robust to outliers than least‐squares regression. See 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details.  This method is used by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). It is the QREG 
command in Stata, version 10.0. Robust regression is used by Baker and Hall (2004). RREG uses Huber weight 
iterations followed by biweight iterations. It is the RREG command in Stata, version 10.0. See Hamilton (1991) for 
details. 
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        Table IV presents the results of the regression analysis with both raw Z-score and log Z-
score as the dependent variables. They are estimated using three distinct methods: median, 
robust, and OLS regressions. Since the lines between banks, investment banks, and insurance 
companies are increasingly blurring,22 I also present the results without industry controls. For 
reasons mentioned previously, we focus on raw Z-score. The overarching message from the 
regressions presented in Table IV is that bigger size is generally associated with greater risk. Size 
enters negatively and is significant at conventional levels. In regressions with the log-
transformation of Z-score, the signs on size are still expected but are less significant. Comparing 
the results across estimation methods, we find that both median and robust regressions generate 
similar estimates, while the OLS estimate has a much larger magnitude. This is not surprising 
considering outliers in our sample.  
 
22 For example, Goldman Sachs and MetLife are now bank holding companies. 
 Table IV 
Firm size (total asset) and risk taking 
      The dependent variable is raw Z-score for the first 6 regressions and logarithm of Z-score for the second 6, which are further separated by whether or not they have industry 
controls.  Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust regression or iteratively 
reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS regressions are based on  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Sample consists of 300 financial firms. 
Regression variables are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is 
capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural 
logarithm of Z-score. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last 
year in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year that 
the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database. ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -2.214** -2.448*** -3.607*** -1.166 -2.080** -3.291*** -0.100*** -0.0801** -0.0461 -0.0661 -0.0633* -0.0217 
(1.115) (0.886) (0.909) (0.903) (0.935) (1.007) (0.0367) (0.0348) (0.0414) (0.0432) (0.0369) (0.0497) 
mb -9.284** -10.15*** -12.04*** -3.115 -3.750 -4.521** -0.668*** -0.599*** -0.555*** -0.350** -0.305** -0.196 
(3.811) (3.523) (2.498) (3.646) (3.822) (2.074) (0.142) (0.139) (0.150) (0.173) (0.149) (0.168) 
dir 5.069*** 4.879*** 5.698*** 3.169*** 4.246*** 5.075*** 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.185*** 0.143** 0.190*** 0.152*** 
(1.509) (1.208) (1.712) (1.190) (1.216) (1.750) (0.050) (0.047) (0.054) (0.057) (0.047) (0.056) 
own -16.58 -26.22* -35.48** 2.567 -13.60 -20.82** -0.555 -0.735 -1.351 0.122 -0.121 -0.519 
(17.99) (14.95) (13.79) (12.74) (14.94) (10.40) (0.604) (0.585) (0.876) (0.610) (0.587) (0.688) 
age 0.111 0.258* 0.279* -0.0599 0.176 0.200 0.009 0.012** 0.010* 0.001 0.008 0.006 
(0.187) (0.149) (0.156) (0.147) (0.150) (0.163) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
ibk -19.26*** -18.17*** -21.58*** -0.939*** -0.909*** -1.107*** 
(4.824) (5.011) (3.492) (0.228) (0.197) (0.271) 
ins -2.521 0.777 0.964 -0.0678 0.0981 0.006 
(5.254) (5.521) (5.291) (0.247) (0.214) (0.193) 
Constant -16.03 -8.446 -4.542 0.125 -7.100 -3.786 2.106*** 1.445** 1.445** 2.311*** 1.371** 1.468** 
(20.06) (16.10) (21.65) (15.43) (15.73) (21.41) (0.661) (0.626) (0.694) (0.732) (0.611) (0.654) 
Obs 300 300 300 300 300 300 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R-squared   0.101 0.101   0.141 0.138   0.140 0.132   0.205 0.210 
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Table IV (continued) 
Panel B: interacting firm size with industry dummies 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -2.920** -2.977** -5.184*** -0.174*** -0.132*** -0.113*** 
(1.240) (1.158) (1.493) (0.061) (0.047) (0.043) 
mb -1.424 -1.807 -1.588 -0.091 -0.190 -0.037 
(3.776) (3.755) (1.824) (0.192) (0.154) (0.193) 
dir 2.668** 3.978*** 5.121*** 0.171*** 0.193*** 0.155*** 
(1.231) (1.152) (1.745) (0.060) (0.047) (0.054) 
own 2.608 -4.967 -12.439 0.146 0.315 0.131 
(13.903) (14.440) (9.377) (0.667) (0.608) (0.625) 
age 0.162 0.289* 0.380* 0.016* 0.014** 0.015** 
(0.172) (0.160) (0.198) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
ibk -46.761*** -42.793*** -61.604*** -3.294*** -2.633*** -3.514*** 
(14.845) (14.479) (12.437) (0.782) (0.629) (1.143) 
ins -27.796 -13.837 -8.797 -1.469 -0.375 0.264 
(24.879) (24.864) (33.792) (1.186) (1.018) (1.107) 
ibk*size 3.687** 3.365* 5.097*** 0.284*** 0.207*** 0.300** 
(1.821) (1.743) (1.527) (0.093) (0.075) (0.120) 
ins*size 3.069 1.731 1.398 0.190 0.061 -0.006 
(2.616) (2.562) (3.357) (0.124) (0.105) (0.119) 
Constant 14.558 -2.962 3.632 2.162*** 1.656*** 1.791*** 
(16.308) (15.287) (22.573) (0.794) (0.627) (0.677) 
Observations 300 300 300 298 298 298 
R-squared   0.142 0.153   0.232 0.252 
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        Our governance variable (dir) enters positively and is significant at the 1% level in all 
regressions, meaning better governance as measured by median director dollar stockholding is 
associated with less risk-taking. This result provides strong evidence that our initial conjecture 
based on Diamond and Rajan (2009) is correct. However, it is in sharp contrast to Cheng, Hong 
and Scheinkman (2009), who use standard governance measures such as G-index and E-index 
and find that governance has no effect on financial firms’ risk-taking. We find similar results, as 
shown in Appendix F, when standard governance indices such as G-index and E-index are used 
as explanatory variables. The reason is that these indices are mostly measures of anti-takeover 
provisions.23 Theoretically, it is hard to make a connection between these provisions and firm 
risk-taking. The economic size of coefficient on dir is consequential. A one standard deviation 
change in dir (1.24) is associated with a change in Z-score of 5.27 (1.24*4.246), an approximate 
21 percent increase from its median (25.29). 
        Comparing the results from regressions with and without industry control reveals that the 
magnitude of the coefficient is smaller in regressions with industry controls, indicating that the 
industry fixed effect might play an important role in shaping financial firms’ risk-taking 
behavior. This point is confirmed by the finding that investment banks are significantly riskier 
than commercial banks: all the coefficients on the investment bank dummy (ibk) are negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This result, however, is not driven by leverage as we have 
documented in the summary statistics that the average investment bank is less leveraged than 
commercial banks. At this point, we are not certain what the underlying factor driving this 
relation is: it may be the nature of investment banking business. In fact, Kwast (1989) documents 
that securities activities have a higher standard deviation of returns than non-securities activities, 
 
        23 The coefficient on size lost its significant because financial firms that are included in the S&P1500 are 
relatively large companies, and may be subject to sample selection bias. 
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and Allen and Jagtiani (1997) find that securities firms on average have the highest market risk 
exposure among all financial institutions. CEO ownership has a negative effect on Z-score, but 
enters insignificantly. As expected, the sign of firm age on Z-score is positive, but its effect is 
only marginally significant. 
        As a robustness check, we use total revenue and total market capitalization as our measures 
for the size of the firm. The results, with the log of total revenue and log of market capitalization 
replacing the log of total asset, are shown in Appendix G and H, respectively. The coefficients on 
total revenue are very similar to those in Table IV, except they are slightly larger in magnitude. 
Coefficients on other variables are qualitatively the same. The results from total capitalization 
are qualitatively similar as well. As an additional robustness check, we restrict our sample to 
those firms with total assets less than $10 billion because we are concerned that the extremely 
large FIs may be fundamentally different from middle and small sized firms, and we report the 
results in Appendix I. As we can see, the results are similar to the previous results.24 
        The results from our additional risk measures broadly support our hypothesis. Panel A of 
Table V shows regression results with market beta, and monthly and annual stock return 
volatility as dependent variables, while Panel B presents the results using write-down as the 
dependent variable. Firstly, the coefficients on firm size are positive and significant, especially in 
market beta and write-down. Secondly, the coefficients on the governance variable are negative 
and significant in the regressions from Panel A but not from Panel B. Lastly, the coefficients on 
the investment bank dummy demonstrate a similar pattern. The result that investment banks have 
a higher beta is consistent with Allen and Jagtiani (1997). 
 
        24 We also ran a separate regression on commercial banks only. The results, shown in Appendix J, support our 
hypothesis. 
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Table V 
Alternative risk measures 
      In Panel A, the dependent variable is market beta (CAPM) for the first 3 regressions and stock return volatilities for the second 6, which are 
further separated by whether it is calculated using monthly or annual return data over the 1998-2008 periods.  In Panel B, the dependent variable 
is log of write-downs and write-down/asset. Write-down is the sum of accounting write-downs for 2007 and 2008, which is obtained from 
company’s SEC filings and Bloomberg using the WDCI function. Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median 
quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust regression or iteratively reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS 
regressions are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Sample consists of 300 financial firms. Regression variables 
are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. For each firm, market beta is calculated as the average CAPM betas for 60 
month rolling regressions over 1998-2008. ln(at) is the logarithm of  asset. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of 
median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our 
sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return 
database ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
Market Beta σ(RET)(annual) σ(RET)(monthly) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) 0.084*** 0.072*** 0.090*** 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.023* 0.020* 0.021* 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
mb 0.342*** 0.356*** 0.451*** 0.242*** 0.332*** 0.309*** 0.226*** 0.199*** 0.187*** 
(0.056) (0.047) (0.110) (0.089) (0.072) (0.098) (0.059) (0.049) (0.065) 
dir -0.037** -0.028** -0.037** -0.057** -0.028 -0.021 -0.039** -0.027** -0.027* 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
own 0.491** 0.481*** 0.040 0.723** 0.933*** 0.504 0.245 0.410** 0.411** 
(0.228) (0.183) (0.270) (0.321) (0.257) (0.494) (0.213) (0.173) (0.172) 
age -0.004* -0.002 -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.005*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ibk 0.806*** 0.809*** 0.926*** 0.344*** 0.471*** 0.533*** 0.328*** 0.396*** 0.410*** 
(0.082) (0.064) (0.116) (0.128) (0.101) (0.119) (0.081) (0.068) (0.081) 
ins 0.095 0.139** 0.053 0.047 0.066 0.066 0.107 0.097 0.094 
(0.074) (0.057) (0.069) (0.116) (0.093) (0.081) (0.077) (0.062) (0.059) 
roa -3.672*** -4.112*** -3.884*** -2.296*** -2.306*** -2.248*** -1.553*** -1.856*** -1.806*** 
(0.483) (0.403) (1.248) (0.559) (0.458) (0.559) (0.365) (0.308) (0.446) 
leverage 0.746*** 0.751*** 0.743* 0.457 0.950*** 0.792** 0.091 0.185 0.196 
(0.262) (0.209) (0.392) (0.343) (0.279) (0.315) (0.216) (0.187) (0.198) 
Constant -0.721** -0.789*** -0.787* -1.046** -1.943*** -1.840*** -2.319*** -2.542*** -2.537*** 
(0.309) (0.247) (0.424) (0.431) (0.348) (0.377) (0.283) (0.234) (0.247) 
Observations 267 267 267 300 300 300 300 300 300 
R-squared   0.726 0.637   0.361 0.337   0.425 0.425 
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Table V (continued) 
Panel B 
log of write-down write-down/asset 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) 1.111*** 1.159*** 1.121*** 0.002 0.005* -0.019 
(0.134) (0.089) (0.080) (0.006) (0.003) (0.019) 
mb 0.132 0.132 0.013 0.003 0.005 -0.039 
(0.344) (0.275) (0.180) (0.014) (0.008) (0.043) 
dir -0.051 -0.061 -0.130 -0.003 -0.003 -0.039 
(0.196) (0.122) (0.123) (0.008) (0.004) (0.027) 
own 4.452 4.242* 4.864* 0.371*** 0.283*** 1.224 
(2.810) (2.276) (2.507) (0.116) (0.073) (1.331) 
age -0.027 -0.029** -0.030*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
ibk -1.500** -1.503*** -0.976 -0.037 -0.043*** 0.136 
(0.625) (0.424) (0.607) (0.026) (0.013) (0.200) 
ins -0.631 -0.450 -0.226 -0.013 -0.015 0.159 
(0.695) (0.441) (0.432) (0.029) (0.014) (0.169) 
Constant -3.161 -3.400* -1.919 0.067 0.042 0.827* 
(2.950) (1.846) (1.927) (0.119) (0.056) (0.493) 
Observations 95 95 95 96 95 96 
R-squared   0.738 0.711     0.219 0.133 
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        To summarize: consistent with H1, we have identified that size has a positive effect on risk-
taking, although this effect becomes weaker when the log transformation of Z-score was used.  
Better governance can significantly reduce risk-taking, which is consistent with H2; and lastly, 
investment banks are riskier than commercial banks, which supports H3. 
A1. Endogeneity of firm size 
        The empirical corporate finance research has long been plagued by the problem of 
endogeneity, and this research is no exception. Specifically, we are particularly concerned about 
the joint determination of risk-taking and firm size. Previous research has identified that banks 
are willing to pay large premium to make acquisitions that will make them sufficiently large and 
TBTF (Brewer III and Jagtiani, 2009). Therefore, although firms are more likely to pursue risk-
taking activities when they become larger, it is also likely that high-risk firms have the incentives 
to increase their sizes to achieve TBTF status. To address this issue, we use the identification 
strategy of instrumental variable (IV). In particular, we make use of variation in whether or not a 
firm incorporates in Delaware as an instrument for firm size. The idea for this instrument is that 
when a company decides to go public, the decision where to incorporate, while not random, 
should be exogenous to the unobservable factors that affect firms’ risk-taking as induced by 
moral hazard of TBTF. The validity of an instrument critically hinges on this exclusion 
restriction.  
        Empirical legal and financial studies have investigated extensively why a firm would 
choose Delaware as its domicile. For example, Daines (2001) and Bhagat and Romano (2002) 
find there is a wealth effect associated with Delaware incorporation, due to the fact that 
Delaware corporate law encourages takeover bids and facilitates the sale of public firms by 
reducing the cost of acquiring a Delaware firm. Apparently, this wealth effect should have 
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nothing to do with a firm’s risk-taking. Bebchuck and Cohen (2003) identify that favorable anti-
takeover protections are important for a state to attract out-of-state incorporation. 25  From a 
different angle, Romano (1985) argues that Delaware’s large store of precedent reduces 
transaction costs and uncertainty about legal liability. Lastly, Fisch (2000) notes the peculiar role 
of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking, arguing that Delaware lawmaking offers 
Delaware corporations a variety of benefits, including flexibility, responsiveness, insulation from 
undue political influence, and transparency. While these factors affect a firm’s domicile decision, 
all of them appear centered around the legal environment of Delaware. In addition, other 
researchers have argued that a firm’s choice of domicile is unimportant and trivial (Black, 1990) 
This literature suggests that our instrumental variable, dummy for Delaware incorporation, does 
not belong to the structural equation, we thus conclude that it is a valid instrument. 
        Table V, Panel A compares Delaware firms with non-Delaware firms in terms of firm 
characteristics, revealing that Delaware firms tend to have a larger market-to-book asset ratio, 
are more likely to be investment banks, and are less leveraged. Panel B of the Table compares 
size and risk-taking for Delaware and non-Delaware firms. It shows that Delaware firms are 
significantly larger and riskier. Figure 3 shows the distributions of firm size, revealing a 
systematic shift in firm size from non-Delaware firms to Delaware firms. 
  
 
        25 We are concerned that anti‐takeover protections might affect risk‐taking, thus rendering the instrument 
invalid. However, the regression of Z‐score on the G/E‐indices, which are primarily measures of anti‐takeover 
provisions, failed to yield significant results (see Table VIII). 
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Table VI 
Comparison of Delaware and non-Delaware firms 
      This table shows the mean difference in firm characteristics, risk-taking and firm size between Non-Delaware 
and Delaware firms.  Statistics based on average annual data over 1998-2008, unless otherwise indicated. Z-score is 
firm’s return on assets plus the capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of asset return over period 1998-
2008. σ(ROA) is the volatility of the firm’s return on assets over the period 1998-2008. σ(RET) is standard deviation 
of annual stock return over 1998-2008. Market-to-book is calculated as market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by book total asset. ROA is the return on asset. Leverage is the debt asset ratio. Director ownership ($) 
is natural logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. CEO ownership 
(%) is percentage of CEO stock ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the 
difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appears in Compustat monthly stock return database. 
Investment bank is a dummy which equals one if investment bank, zero otherwise. Insurance company is defined 
analogously.   
         Panel A                
Firm characteristics 
Variables 
market to  
book ratio 
Director  
Ownership 
CEO  
ownership  age 
Investment 
bank 
Insurance  
company  ROA  Leverage 
non‐Delaware  1.110  13.611  0.041  18.791  0.058  0.068  0.004  0.882 
Delaware  1.262  13.657  0.048  19.490  0.271  0.125  0.014  0.843 
Difference  0.152  0.047  0.007  0.698  0.213  0.057  0.010  ‐0.039 
t statistics  2.21  0.30  0.55  0.45  4.40  1.49  1.20  ‐1.990 
         Panel B                
Size measures  Risk measures 
Variables 
Log(total  
asset) 
Log(total  
revenue) 
Log(mkt  
value)  Z‐score 
log(Z‐
score)  σ(ROA)  σ(RET) 
non‐Delaware  7.589  5.086  5.812  38.397  3.260  0.017  0.337 
Delaware  8.827  6.556  7.153  24.802  2.770  0.030  0.398 
Difference  1.238  1.470  1.341  ‐13.594  ‐0.489  0.013  0.061 
t statistics  4.59  5.74  5.15     ‐3.85  ‐3.89  1.45  2.05 
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Figure 3 
Empirical distribution of firm size by non‐Delaware firms and Delaware firms.  
      Firm  size  is  the  logarithm  transformation  of  the  average  size  from  1998‐2008  for  each  firm.  The 
sample includes commercial banks, investment banks and insurance companies. Epanechnikov kernel. 
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i i
        The IV approach involves estimating a two-stage model of the following form: 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i iz size mb dir own age ibk insα α α α α α α α= + + + + + + + +ε
i i
            (2) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i isize de mb dir own age ibk insβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +υ                    (3) 
where dei is a dummy variable which equals one if  firm i is Delaware incorporated, and the rest 
of the variables are defined as per Eq. (1) 
        Identification of the IV model requires a strong correlation between the Delaware dummy 
variable and firm size because a weak instrument can lead to large inconsistencies. Results from 
the first-stage regression with and without the full set of controls are presented in Table VII, Part 
A. For the specification with a full set of controls (col. 2), the entire set of independent variables 
explains about 60% of the variation in firm size while the included instrument variable alone 
explains about 10%. The standard error is 0.21 and the partial F-statistic on the excluded 
instrument is 25.89, which satisfies the weak instrument test (the rule of thumb value is 10) as 
discussed in Bound et al (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997). To further verify this is the case, 
we perform a formal weak instrument test as proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005): if the F-
statistic from the first-stage regression exceeds the critical value (using 5% bias), the instrument 
is deemed to be valid. As we can see from the bottom of the table, the critical value is 16.38, 
which is less than the F-statistic; we thus claim that we do not have a weak instrument problem. 
Overall, the results from the first stage regression indicate that Delaware firms on average are 
significantly larger than non-Delaware firms. This result is consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen 
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(2004) who identify a similar pattern based on a universe of all publicly traded firms in the 
Compustat database at the end of 1999.26 
        Results from IV estimates for risk-taking, as measured by Z-score, logarithm of Z-score, 
standard deviation of return on assets and annual stock return, are reported in Table VII, Part B. 
The results on Z-score are not only consistent with but also strengthen our previous findings in 
Table IV: the coefficient on size is negative and the magnitude is around four times larger for IV 
estimates. This fact suggests that the OLS estimate underestimates the true effect of firm size on 
risk-taking. In addition, we find that CEO ownership does have an impact on inducing risk-
taking, consistent with existing theory. The results in Column 3 reveal that size does not have a 
significant impact on volatility of stock return. This result is consistent with Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997), who do not find evidence that the size of bank holding companies is negatively 
correlated with stock return variance. The findings on governance variable and investment banks 
are consistent with previous findings. 
  
 
        26 See Table 8, page 403 of their paper. 
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Table VII 
Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) IV regression of firm size on risk-taking 
      Part A presents the first-stage regressions of firm size on the instrumental variable (Delaware), and other pre-determined 
controls included in the second stage regressions of risk-taking on firm size. These controls include market-to-book asset ratio, 
median director dollar stockholding, CEO stock ownership, firm age, dummy for investment bank, dummy for insurance 
company, return on asset, and leverage. Part B reports the results from the second-stage regressions of risk-taking on firm size 
and control variables, in which firm size, instrumented by Delaware, is treated as an endogenous variable. Sample consists of 300 
financial firms. Regression variables are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Delaware is dummy, 
which equals 1 if a firm is incorporated in Delaware. Z-score = (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and 
CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. 
Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score.  σ(RETY) is the standard deviation of annual 
stock return over 1998-2008. σ(RETM) is the standard deviation of monthly stock return over 1998-2008. ln(at) is the logarithm 
of  total asset. mb is the market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year 
in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied 
by the difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy 
for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Leverage is debt/asset ratio. F-statistic is the partial F-statistic 
on the instrument. Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument tests report the critical value using 5% relative bias tolerance. DWH 
test is Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Part A: First-Stage Regression: Firm Size (log) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Delaware 1.238*** 1.046*** 0.923*** 
(0.270) (0.206) (0.197) 
mb -0.494* -0.166 
(0.260) (0.357) 
dir 0.411*** 0.327*** 
(0.074) (0.068) 
own -4.273*** -2.271** 
(1.241) (1.146) 
age 0.092*** 0.092*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
ibk 0.290 1.430*** 
(0.491) (0.527) 
ins 2.003*** 2.103*** 
(0.463) (0.432) 
roa 2.941 
(2.862) 
leverage 5.410*** 
(1.158) 
Constant 7.589*** 0.879 -3.285** 
(0.132) (0.988) (1.355) 
Partial R2 0.098 0.088 
F-statistic 21.04 25.89 21.99 
Observations 302 300 300 
R-squared 0.075 0.568 0.623 
Stock and Yogo (2005) 
Weak Instrument Tests - 16.38 16.38 
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Table VII (continued) 
Part B: Second-Stage Regression: Firm Size on Risk-taking 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Z-score ln(Z-score) σ(RETY)  σ(RETM) 
ln(at) -8.348** -0.249* 0.007 0.008 
(3.744) (0.149) (0.029) (0.005) 
mb -6.818** -0.279 0.219*** 0.035*** 
(3.422) (0.210) (0.082) (0.012) 
dir 7.258*** 0.248*** -0.001 -0.005** 
(2.201) (0.087) (0.014) (0.003) 
own -44.387** -1.663* 0.337 0.064* 
(22.548) (0.917) (0.265) (0.034) 
age 0.681* 0.027* -0.004 -0.001** 
(0.401) (0.015) (0.003) (0.001) 
ibk -17.565*** -0.890** 0.261** 0.039** 
(6.267) (0.376) (0.103) (0.018) 
ins 12.535 0.526 0.011 -0.005 
(10.108) (0.376) (0.074) (0.014) 
roa -1.996*** -0.363*** 
(0.698) (0.122) 
leverage 0.426 0.004 
(0.288) (0.054) 
Constant 0.029 1.659** -0.270 0.072 
(23.403) (0.735) (0.274) (0.049) 
Observations 300 298 300 300 
R-squared 0.082 0.118 0.455 0.459 
 
A2. Time and firm fixed effect 
        The previous analyses use cross-sectional regressions with average annual data over a 10-
year period. Such a long period raises concerns that any changes in macroeconomic conditions or 
market-wide fluctuations could have influenced risk-taking in the financial industry. Even worse, 
any unobservable firm fixed effect could also bias our results. To address these concerns, we 
apply the identification strategy of the fixed effect model. To make sure there is enough variation 
in firm size from one period to the next, we obtain quarterly data during 2001—2008 and divide 
it into a two 4-year sub-periods, 2001—2004 and 2005—2008. We choose 2001 instead of 1998 
as the starting point as this will avoid the impact of a series of bank-related regulations enacted 
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in the late 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and 
the Commodities and Futures Modernization Act of 2000. We specify our model as follows: 
1 2it i it it t itz size mbα ρ ρ λ= + + + +ε  27       (t = 1, 2)                                       (4) 
where i indexes firm. t indexes period.  is Z-score for firm i in period t, calculated using 
quarterly data in period t;  is the average size of firm i over 16 quarters (4 years) in period t; 
 is the average market-to-book asset ratio of firm i over 16 quarters in period t; 
itz
itsize
itmb iα  and tλ  are 
firm and time fixed effects, respectively. I cluster standard errors at the firm level to account for 
correlations in standard errors specific to a firm (Petersen, 2009). 
        Results from the fixed effects models, as shown in Table VIII, strengthen our previous 
finding: firm size enters negatively and is significant at the 1% level in regressions with Z-score 
as the dependent variable. In addition, the coefficient on the period2 dummy is negative and 
highly significant, implying a significant increase in risk-taking in the second period (2004—
2008) comparing with the first one, consistent with the recent financial turmoil. 
  
                                                            
        27 Fixed effect estimator is also called the within estimator. The effect of any time‐invariant variables, such as 
industry dummies and director ownership, or variables that are perfectly correlated with time, such as age, will not 
be identified and thus are excluded from this model. 
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Table VIII 
Fixed effect model 
            This table shows the effect of firm size on risk taking based on quarterly data from 2001-2008, except for 
stock return volatility which uses monthly stock return data. This period is further divided into two sub-periods, 
2001-2004 and 2005-2008. Using quarterly data or monthly data, regression variables are computed as the averages 
over each of the two 4-year periods, unless otherwise noted. The dependent variable is raw Z-score, log of Z-score, 
and monthly stock return volatility, respectively. Sample consists of 670 financial firms or 1,190 firm-periods. Z-
score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio. σ(ROA) is 
the standard deviation of ROA. Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score. 
ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. Period2 is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if it is second period, zero otherwise.  Leverage is debt/asset ratio. Standard errors, clustered at firm 
level, are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Z-score ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
ln(at) -50.12*** -0.691*** -0.498 
(18.57) (0.223) (1.152) 
mb -31.21 -0.937 8.639* 
(43.13) (0.777) (4.672) 
period2 -44.13*** -0.375*** 1.234** 
(9.824) (0.0988) (0.494) 
roa -148.2* 
(84.45) 
leverage 15.71* 
(9.017) 
Constant 564.7*** 10.69*** -11.18 
(146.9) (1.836) (13.77) 
# of firm-period 1,193 1,186 1,193 
R-squared 0.153 0.242 0.116 
Number of firms 670 668 670 
 
B. Decomposition of Z-score 
        In this section, we argue that what contributed to the demise of many financial institutions 
during the financial crisis was their extremely low and deteriorating capital asset ratio.  We show 
that, over time, large FIs have been reducing their capital asset ratio, and that cross-sectionally, 
larger FIs are substantially less capitalized compared to smaller ones. At the 2011 American 
Finance Association (AFA) annual meeting, MIT Professor Simon Johnson called it dangerous 
debt and questioned the rationale of maintaining such a high leverage for large FIs. 
 
51 
 
        Figure 4 shows the time series of several large financial firms’ capital ratio and return on 
asset, such as the AIG, Wells Fargo & Co, and Prudential Financial Group Inc.   Figure 4 shows 
clearly that those firms’ capital asset ratio has been decreasing steadily, regardless of whether the 
whole sample period (Panel A) or just the crisis period (Panel B) is considered. As for the 
magnitude of the change, it decreased from above 14% in 1998 to just over 7% in 2008 – an 
approximate of 50% decrease, in the case of AIG.  
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Figure 4 
Time series of Capital Asset Ratio and Return on Asset for periods: 1998-2008 and 2006-2008 
This figure shows the time-series capital asset ratio and return on asset over the whole sample period 
(1998-2008, Panel A) and the crisis period (2006-2008, Panel B) for the 10 largest firms in my sample. 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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        Also noteworthy from the figure is the change in profitability over time. As a consequence 
of the financial crisis, which exposed them to the downside of the risk, not only has the return on 
asset become more volatile, it also has decreased dramatically from 2.5% in 1998, to negative 
7% in 2008, a magnitude of about 200% drop in profitability. The significant drop in capital 
asset ratio and profitability, and a rise in the volatility of profitability contributed to the very low 
level of the Z-score.  While the capital asset ratio of these large FIs indicates a decreasing 
pattern, variation does exist. For example, the Bank of America Corp’s capital ratio has 
increased slightly over time. 
        To further investigate the relationship between capital asset ratio and firm size, we 
decompose the Z-score. Z-score has three components –ROA, CAR, and σ(ROA) – and a higher 
level of ROA and higher capital asset ratios (CAR) translate into higher Z-scores, while a larger 
standard deviation of ROA translates into lower Z-scores28 . Thus, when we find a positive 
relation between size and risk-taking, it may attribute to a lower ROA, lower capital ratio, and/or 
a higher standard deviation. Therefore, it is possible that size may not necessarily increase the 
risk of firm assets, but rather the drop in Z-score may instead be attributed to a decline in the 
average bank capital ratio or return on asset. To further explore how the various components of 
the Z-score move in response to an increase in firm size, we run regressions treating each of 
these Z-score components as a separate dependent variable.29 The empirical results are reported 
in Table IX 
  
 
        28 Since the year 2004 when Basel II Accord was implemented is included in our sample period, we are 
concerned that this event might affect firms’ capital asset ratio. However, simple tests rule out this is the case (see 
Appendix K). 
        29 We follow Houston et al, 2010. 
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Table IX 
Decomposition of Z-score 
      The dependent variables are CAR, log of CAR (panel A), ROA, and σ(ROA) (panel B), respectively. Results from three 
estimation methods are presented: Median is median quantile regression, Robust is robust regression or iteratively reweighted least 
squares, OLS is ordinary least squares with White heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. Sample consists of 300 financial firms. 
Regression variables are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted Following Houston et al (2010), ROA is 
return on assets and CAR is capital-asset ratio, both are averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 
1998-2008. Higher of ROA and CAR imply more stability. The ROA multiplied by 100 is used in regressions. ln(at) is the logarithm 
of  total asset. mb is the market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in 
our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the 
difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for 
investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Leverage is debt/asset ratio. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: capital asset ratio 
CAR ln(CAR) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.021*** -0.071*** -0.092*** -0.117*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) 
mb 0.137*** 0.193*** 0.083** 0.423*** 0.521*** 0.327*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.040) (0.043) (0.051) (0.114) 
dir -0.002** -0.002** -0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.023 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
own 0.138*** -0.023 0.250** 0.094 -0.081 0.301 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.105) (0.156) (0.183) (0.319) 
age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ibk 0.116*** 0.001 0.192*** 0.772*** 0.699*** 0.753*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.057) (0.063) (0.145) 
ins 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.061*** 0.193*** 0.309*** 0.300*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.061) (0.067) (0.098) 
roa -0.262*** -0.489*** -0.024 -0.856*** -1.291*** 0.078 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.322) (0.279) (0.339) (0.850) 
Constant 0.005 -0.038** 0.189*** -2.473*** -2.285*** -1.742*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.064) (0.181) (0.196) (0.258) 
Observations 300 299 300 300 300 300 
R-squared   0.925 0.661   0.702 0.608 
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Panel B: ROA and volatility of ROA 
ROA σ(ROA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.039** -0.029* 0.492 0.029 0.043 -0.004 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.446) (0.056) (0.038) (0.042) 
mb 4.335*** 3.587*** 5.956* 0.662*** 0.648*** 0.743*** 
(0.069) (0.071) (3.424) (0.219) (0.177) (0.232) 
dir 0.071*** 0.050*** 0.140 -0.126* -0.159*** -0.147*** 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.222) (0.069) (0.046) (0.050) 
own -1.687*** -1.054*** -3.228 -1.637* -1.162* -0.909 
(0.262) (0.246) (8.123) (0.855) (0.598) (0.812) 
age 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.027 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.043) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
ibk -0.177* -0.193** -4.404 1.375*** 0.714*** 0.970*** 
(0.101) (0.092) (3.045) (0.338) (0.232) (0.268) 
ins 0.209** 0.069 -0.747 0.020 -0.084 0.044 
(0.099) (0.085) (1.238) (0.307) (0.213) (0.189) 
roa -7.630*** -10.833*** -4.720** 
(1.458) (1.245) (2.183) 
leverage 1.127*** 1.385*** 0.876 -2.920*** -4.321*** -3.341*** 
(0.282) (0.270) (12.023) (0.933) (0.639) (0.827) 
Constant -5.542*** -4.777*** -11.553 -2.117* -0.369 -1.205 
(0.350) (0.328) (11.650) (1.171) (0.799) (0.912) 
Observations 300 298 300 300 299 300 
R-squared   0.918 0.187   0.609 0.540 
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Panel C: Interacting investment banks with firm size 
CAR ln(CAR) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004 -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.052*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
mb 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.036 0.144*** 0.093* 0.141 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.045) (0.053) (0.053) (0.121) 
dir -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.014 -0.020 -0.026* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) 
own 0.036*** -0.030** 0.167 -0.472*** -0.523*** -0.027 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.106) (0.164) (0.168) (0.335) 
age 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ibk 0.632*** 0.676*** 0.622*** 2.926*** 3.109*** 2.458*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.119) (0.192) (0.175) (0.324) 
ins 0.020*** 0.011** 0.025* 0.171** 0.167*** 0.157 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.069) (0.062) (0.110) 
roa 0.047** 0.616*** 0.242 0.934** 0.691* 1.133 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.398) (0.360) (0.379) (1.106) 
ibk*size -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.258*** -0.273*** -0.211*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.022) (0.020) (0.034) 
Constant 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.153*** -2.162*** -1.961*** -1.887*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.052) (0.194) (0.175) (0.230) 
Observations 300 299 300 300 299 300 
R-squared   0.974 0.739   0.797 0.685 
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Panel D: Full interaction 
CAR ln(CAR) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001 -0.022* -0.016 -0.026 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) 
mb 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.034 0.159*** 0.071 0.131 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.046) (0.047) (0.050) (0.120) 
dir -0.002 -0.002* -0.006* -0.018 -0.021 -0.026* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
own 0.026* -0.033** 0.167 -0.283* -0.562*** -0.030 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.107) (0.153) (0.159) (0.334) 
age 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.004** 0.001 0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ibk 0.650*** 0.679*** 0.647*** 2.902*** 3.372*** 2.661*** 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.120) (0.176) (0.172) (0.323) 
ins 0.173*** 0.203*** 0.182*** 1.798*** 1.953*** 1.437*** 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.057) (0.275) (0.271) (0.443) 
roa 0.051* 0.604*** 0.244 -0.027 0.726** 1.150 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.399) (0.320) (0.360) (1.110) 
ibk*size -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.263*** -0.305*** -0.237*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) 
ins*size -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.174*** -0.186*** -0.135*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.029) (0.028) (0.046) 
Constant 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.135*** -2.230*** -2.088*** -2.029*** 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.051) (0.178) (0.169) (0.218) 
Observations 300 299 300 300 299 300 
R-squared   0.973 0.743   0.821 0.700 
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Panel E: Interacting investment bank with firm size. 
ROA σ(ROA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.046*** -0.026* -0.128 0.068 0.064 0.066* 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.149) (0.059) (0.043) (0.038) 
mb 5.222*** 3.419*** 6.535* 0.346* 0.554*** 0.579*** 
(0.049) (0.062) (3.372) (0.203) (0.174) (0.182) 
dir 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.220 -0.103 -0.165*** -0.160*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.201) (0.065) (0.047) (0.050) 
own -1.422*** -0.842*** -1.644 -1.312* -1.068* -1.057 
(0.186) (0.215) (8.426) (0.755) (0.601) (0.690) 
age 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.031 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
ibk -5.870*** -5.929*** -26.398** 4.244*** 3.940*** 3.779*** 
(0.219) (0.246) (11.431) (0.991) (0.769) (0.760) 
ins 0.194*** 0.082 0.390 -0.031 -0.079 -0.087 
(0.067) (0.076) (0.695) (0.296) (0.220) (0.192) 
roa -3.971*** -3.322*** -3.177* 
(1.466) (1.143) (1.642) 
leverage -3.261*** -3.404*** -10.240 -2.103** -1.817** -1.968*** 
(0.220) (0.267) (14.795) (0.994) (0.743) (0.756) 
ibk*size 0.490*** 0.487*** 2.524** -0.332*** -0.325*** -0.315*** 
(0.024) (0.027) (1.061) (0.106) (0.082) (0.078) 
Constant -2.036*** -0.253 0.534 -3.107*** -2.620*** -2.534*** 
(0.270) (0.316) (14.639) (1.194) (0.884) (0.912) 
Observations 300 298 300 300 300 300 
R-squared   0.930 0.287   0.557 0.563 
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Panel F: full interaction 
ROA σ(ROA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.049*** -0.024 -0.180 0.105* 0.091* 0.085** 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.125) (0.057) (0.047) (0.043) 
mb 5.215*** 3.420*** 6.543* 0.546*** 0.544*** 0.574*** 
(0.045) (0.063) (3.377) (0.201) (0.174) (0.180) 
dir 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.221 -0.106* -0.166*** -0.160*** 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.201) (0.057) (0.047) (0.050) 
own -1.404*** -0.840*** -1.676 -1.140* -1.043* -1.045 
(0.169) (0.216) (8.459) (0.675) (0.598) (0.679) 
age 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.037* -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
ibk -5.886*** -5.889*** -26.935** 4.918*** 4.245*** 3.984*** 
(0.207) (0.257) (11.813) (0.855) (0.793) (0.796) 
ins 0.161 0.181 -2.245 2.306* 1.316 0.873 
(0.262) (0.354) (3.334) (1.203) (1.016) (1.208) 
roa -3.904*** -3.222*** -3.144* 
(1.256) (1.137) (1.622) 
leverage -3.259*** -3.373*** -10.463 -0.897 -1.684** -1.884** 
(0.200) (0.270) (14.988) (0.842) (0.744) (0.757) 
ibk*size 0.492*** 0.483*** 2.588** -0.400*** -0.361*** -0.339*** 
(0.023) (0.028) (1.106) (0.093) (0.085) (0.083) 
ins*size 0.005 -0.011 0.277 -0.240** -0.148 -0.101 
(0.028) (0.036) (0.303) (0.122) (0.105) (0.131) 
Constant -2.005*** -0.290 1.021 -4.654*** -2.871*** -2.711*** 
(0.251) (0.324) (15.036) (1.055) (0.898) (0.919) 
Observations 300 298 300 300 300 300 
R-squared   0.930 0.288   0.563 0.564 
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        We see that an increase in size is associated with a decrease in capital asset ratio at the 1% 
significance level across all three estimation methods, consistent with Schmid and Walter (2009).  
As for the economic effect, on average, a 10% percent increase in size translates into almost a 
one percentage point reduction in capital asset ratio, holding other variables constant. Size 
negatively affects return on asset, but only marginally, and size does not decrease earnings 
volatility. These results indicate that the lower Z-score is driven primarily by a reduction in 
capital, and the size-related economy of scale, if any, does not exist in the financial industry. 
Indeed, a large body of empirical literature on the economies of scale of financial firms has 
produced inconclusive results.  
        Our finding is also consistent with Geanakoplos (2010) who argues that extremely high 
leverage in boom times has a huge impact on the price of assets, contributing to economic 
bubbles and busts. He suggests that the Federal Reserve should manage system-wide leverage, 
curtailing leverage in ebullient times, and propping up leverage in anxious times. This finding 
has direct policy implications: instead of setting a size threshold, strengthening capital 
requirements might be a more direct way to solve the excessive risk-taking problem as 
pronounced in the FIs. 
        Beyond the revealing finding regarding how exactly size affects the Z-score, note that the 
results from the specification on CAR in Table IX  are consistent with several stylized facts 
known from capital structure literature.30 For instance, market-to-book asset ratio is positively 
correlated with CAR, ROA is negatively correlated with CAR, and the constant term, which can 
 
        30 See Frank and Goyal (2008) for a survey of literature on capital structure. 
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be thought of as a tangible asset, 31  is negatively correlated with CAR. These results are 
consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
        The control variables also yield interesting and consistent findings. Corporate governance 
(dir) is positively associated with ROA and negatively associated with earning volatility, but has 
no effect on capital asset ratio. These results suggest better governance enhances firm 
performance, consistent with Bhagat and Bolton (2008) who note a significant and positive 
relationship between this variable and contemporaneous and next year’s operating performance. 
These findings aid us in understanding more about the effect of variable dir on risk-taking as 
shown in Table IV: the risk-reducing mechanism of corporate governance is mainly through an 
increase in ROA and a reduction in earnings volatility.  The market-to-book asset ratio enters 
positively in all regressions in Table IX, and is significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on 
age indicate that, all else being equal, experienced firms are more profitable, better capitalized, 
and better at reducing stock return volatility, as they should be. 
CHAPTER 5 
Do financial firms of different size behave differently? 
A.  Specification 
        After having established that on average, larger firms are riskier than small firms, a natural 
question to ask is: do firms of different size cohorts behave differently? Researchers have shown 
that the status of TBTF itself has values. For instance, using an event study methodology, O’hara 
and Shaw (1990) find a positive wealth effect accruing to TBTF banks. Brewer III and Jagtiani 
(2009) document that financial firms were willing to pay at least $14 billion in added premiums 
 
        31 Financial firms usually have a relatively small portion of tangible assets, which can be thought of as constant 
in the specification. 
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i i
to mergers which will make them obtain the status of TBTF. To address the above question, we 
test whether the marginal effect of firm size on risk-taking is different between firms who may 
be considered TBTF and firms who are not. 
        Specifically, we interact the firm size with the dummy variable for the TBTF group. This 
method suits our needs well because it gives us the difference in estimates of size on risk-taking 
with a standard error for two separate regressions: for the TBTF group and for the non-TBTF 
group. 
        To be more concrete, I estimate the following equation:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9*i i i i i i i i i iz big size big size mb dir own age ibk insλ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + + + + + + +ξ     (5) 
where is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i is TBTF, and the rest of the variables 
are defined as per Eq. (1). We are particularly interested in estimating
ibig
3λ , which captures the 
effect of size on firm’s risk-taking for large firms as compared to small firms. To identify TBTF 
correctly is not a trivial task. The reason is that, although we observe government rescues ex 
post, but no firm has ever been identified officially as TBTF ex ante.  We address this issue by 
relying on theory based on Goodhart and Huang (2005) who show that the central bank would 
only rescue banks which are above a threshold size.32 We define firms with total asset over $10 
billion as TBTF.33 
B. Results on risk shift 
                                                            
        32 As shown in Goodhart and Huang (2005), in addition to size, the central bank’s ultimate rescue decision also 
depends on the tradeoff between contagion and moral hazard effects.   
        33 We tried $50 billion and $100 billion cutoffs, the results are qualitatively unchanged for variable Z‐score. For 
variable equity volatility, the coefficient on the interaction term lost its significance. 
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        The empirical literature on bank risk-shifting begins with Marcus and Shaked (1984), and it 
occurs when the government is exposed to loss from increased asset volatility or leverage 
without receiving corresponding adequate compensation for the risk entailed. Systemic FIs have 
stronger incentives to engage in riskier activities due to the fact that the risk-shifting is 
subsidized: the cost of becoming TBTF is far less than the value of the explicit and implicit 
government guarantees. 
        Results for risk-shifting are shown in Table X with the raw Z-score, the log of Z-score and 
equity volatility as respective dependent variables. Again, the results with three estimation 
methods are presented. The variable of interest is the interaction term (big_size). The sign on 
big_size is negative, meaning an increase in size is associated with greater decrease in Z-score 
(and ln(Z-score)) for big firms than for small firms, but it is not significant at conventional level. 
The coefficient on big seems contradictory to our previous finding that larger firms are 
associated with higher risk-taking.  Our explanation is that, for this particular specification, the 
coefficient on big tests whether there is difference in risk-taking between big and small firms 
when firm size equals zero, which does not bear any meaningful interpretation. Consistent with 
the findings in Table IV, governance variable (dir) has a significant effect in reducing firm risk-
taking; investment banks are riskier than commercial banks.  
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Table X 
Changes in risk for TBTF firms. 
      The dependent variables are Z-score, log of Z-score, and σ(RET), respectively. Results from three estimation methods are presented: 
Median is median quantile regression, Robust is robust regression or iteratively reweighted least squares, OLS is ordinary least squares 
with White heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. Sample consists of 300 financial firms. Regression variables are computed as the 
averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is 
capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies 
more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score.  σ(RET) is the standard deviation of annual stock return over 1998-2008. big 
is dummy, which equals 1 for firms with total assets over $10 billion. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. big_size is interaction term of 
big and ln(at). mb is the market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our 
sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the 
difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibd is dummy for investment 
banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Leverage is debt/asset ratio. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Z-score   ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
big 0.795 20.67 13.34 -0.347 0.167 0.867 -1.098*** -0.989** -0.878** 
(24.22) (25.51) (23.36) (1.220) (0.996) (0.964) (0.381) (0.416) (0.401) 
logat -0.806 -1.611 -3.017 -0.082 -0.058 0.029 -0.062*** -0.038 -0.031 
(1.372) (1.407) (1.856) (0.070) (0.056) (0.092) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) 
big_size -0.281 -1.985 -1.288 0.0359 -0.0171 -0.103 0.126*** 0.107** 0.0932** 
(2.417) (2.541) (2.451) (0.122) (0.0995) (0.106) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040) 
mb -2.741 -3.783 -4.580** -0.352* -0.305** -0.202 0.214*** 0.325*** 0.308*** 
(3.635) (3.827) (2.052) (0.181) (0.150) (0.164) (0.062) (0.071) (0.098) 
dir 3.126*** 4.104*** 5.008*** 0.162*** 0.189*** 0.148** -0.056*** -0.024 -0.018 
(1.184) (1.224) (1.768) (0.060) (0.048) (0.058) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) 
own 1.790 -12.51 -20.27* 0.134 -0.110 -0.439 0.772*** 0.909*** 0.470 
(12.72) (15.00) (10.76) (0.642) (0.594) (0.692) (0.226) (0.253) (0.489) 
age -0.0562 0.166 0.191 0.001 0.008 0.006 -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
(0.150) (0.154) (0.162) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
ibk -19.70*** -17.61*** -21.25*** -0.937*** -0.905*** -1.060*** 0.337*** 0.442*** 0.509*** 
(4.931) (5.140) (3.762) (0.246) (0.202) (0.249) (0.090) (0.010) (0.120) 
ins -2.271 0.430 0.826 -0.0121 0.0958 0.0286 0.025 0.060 0.063 
(5.395) (5.614) (5.422) (0.263) (0.219) (0.189) (0.085) (0.093) (0.080) 
roa -1.527*** -2.140*** -2.122*** 
(0.406) (0.456) (0.523) 
leverage 0.546** 1.004*** 0.828*** 
(0.242) (0.275) (0.316) 
Constant -1.715 -8.651 -4.724 2.146** 1.350** 1.165 -0.653** -1.732*** -1.687*** 
(16.74) (17.21) (24.68) (0.844) (0.674) (0.749) (0.330) (0.359) (0.405) 
Obs 300 300 300 298 298 298 300 300 300 
R-squared   0.141 0.139     0.205 0.213     0.380 0.348 
 
 
68 
 
                                                           
        Regression results with equity volatility as a dependent variable from the last panel in Table 
X are interesting. The coefficient on logat measures the effect of size on risk-taking for small 
firms only; they are negative and significant in the median regression, indicating size-related 
diversification only exists for firms below a certain threshold size; once firms pass this threshold, 
the diversification effect either disappears or attenuates significantly. Finding on roa and 
leverage are consistent with Table V as well. 
        Based on findings from Table X, we conclude that there is no significant evidence that big 
firms behave differently than small firms, which is inconsistent with H4. 
CHAPTER 6 
Policy Implications 
      The recent financial crisis of 2008 has eroded the economic net worth of many financial 
institutions. The consensus has been that TBTF financial firms took too much risk prior to the 
crisis. Regarding remedies, many opinions have been expressed such as capping the size of 
firms. However, given the difficulty of correctly identifying TBTF financial institutions, serious 
concerns have been raised with this simple size constraint. In this paper, we went one step further 
to find out that, although we do observe a positive association between firm size and risk-taking, 
what is really going on behind the scene is that these firms have taken too much leverage. This 
finding has important implications for policy makers: regulations designed to rein in the risk-
taking of financial firms should focus more on capital requirements,34 this suggestion is also 
reinforced by the fact that leverage is positively associated with equity volatility. As Judah S. 
Kraushaar, managing director of Roaring Brook Capital, L.P., pointed out, “attacking excessive 
 
        34 To be clear, what is the optimal capital requirement policy is a question deserving future research and 
beyond the scope of this paper. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008) have a discussion about this question. 
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leverage in the banking system may go a long way toward dampening the boom-bust cycle that 
has become alarmingly intense in recent decades”35.  
        As a suggestion, for example, regulators can set capital requirements in such a way that they 
are proportionate in size36. The common concern for raising capital is that equity is “expensive” 
and capital adversely affects bank value. However, recent study on bank capital challenges this 
view and provides theoretical and empirical evidence that total bank value and the bank’s equity 
capital are positively correlated in the cross-section (Mehran and Thakor, 2010). We agree that 
such solution may not be optimal,37 but it has the advantage of tackling the problem from the 
root: correcting the distortion in risk-taking incentives. This becomes even more relevant when 
policy makers are faced with the thorny problem of correctly categorizing TBTF banks along 
with other obstacles mentioned earlier. 
        Our second finding that corporate governance, measured as median director dollar stock 
ownership, can significantly influence firm’s risk-taking also bears its own merits. This measure 
is rather simple and intuitive compared with standard governance indices, thus it is relatively 
easier for corporate boards to implement when making risk management policies. Our last 
finding that investment banks are consistently riskier than commercial banks reminds us of the 
watershed events of the 1930s when the so-called Glass-Steagall Act was passed to prohibit 
 
        35 “Banks Need Clear Capital Rules”, the Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2010. 
        36  This point is similar to the recommendation in The Squam Lake Report, where it argues that, if everything 
else is the same, large banks should face higher capital requirements than small banks. This idea has also been 
proposed by Congressional Oversight Panel as one way to limit excessive risk‐taking (see, Congressional Oversight 
Panel, 2009, p. 26). “Of Banks and Bonus”, New York Times, July 27, 2009, has similar arguments as well. 
37 Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that it is impossible to implement any Pareto‐efficient outcome 
using just capital requirements as the tool of prudential regulation. They propose a combination of deposit rate 
controls and capital requirements. However, their arguments only apply to deposit‐taking financial firms. Marshall 
and Prescott (2001) have similar arguments. 
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firms with a commercial banking charter from conducting security business. It provides 
justification for the functional separation of investment banking from universal banking. 
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Appendix A 
Theoretical development of Z‐score (Boyd and Runkle (1993)) 
Notation: let  
, , , / ,profits A assets E equity k E A r Aπ π= = = =− =% % %  
In their paper, Z‐score is a measure of probability of failure, which is a state when losses exceed equity: 
( ) ( ) ( )
k
p E p r k r dπ φ−∞< − = < = ∫% % r%  
If we assume that: 
( , )r N ρ σ%    
here  ρ and σ is the population mean and standard deviation of return on asset, respectively. 
Then: 
( )p r k<% ( ( ) /p k )τ ρ σ= < −  
                                                                                 
( )/
(0,1)
k
N d
ρ σ τ−−∞= ∫  
                                                                                 
( / / )/
(0,1)
E A A
N d
π σ τ− +−∞= ∫  
                                                                                  (0,1)
z
N dτ−−∞= ∫  
here τ is standard normal random variable, N(0,1) is standard normal PDF. 
We thus have: 
/ /
( )
E A A CAR ROAz
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π
σ σ
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Appendix B 
Capital Asset Ratio 
 
Definitions: 
Tier 1 capital ratio = Tier 1 capital / Risk-adjusted assets 
Total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) ratio = Total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) / Risk-adjusted assets  
Leverage ratio = Tier 1 capital / Average total consolidated assets  
Common stockholders’ equity ratio = Common stockholders’ equity / Balance sheet assets  
 
Illustration: 
In millions of dollars at year-end 2003 2007 2008 
Tier 1 capital        
Common stockholders’ equity $96,889 $113,447 $70,966 
Qualifying perpetual preferred 
stock 1,125   70,664 
Qualifying mandatorily 
redeemable 
 securities of subsidiary trusts 6,257 23,594 23,899 
Minority interest 1,158 4,077 1,268 
Total Tier 1 capital $66,871 $89,226 $118,758 
Tier 2 capital        
Allowance for credit losses  9,545 15,778 12,806 
Qualifying debt  13,573 26,690 24,791 
Total Tier 2 capital $23,472 $44,895 $37,640 
Total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) $90,343 $134,121 $156,398 
Risk-adjusted assets  $750,293 $1,253,321 $996,247 
 
Ratios: 
At year-end 2003 2007 2008 
Tier 1 capital 8.91% 7.12% 11.92% 
Total capital (Tier 1  
and Tier 2) 12.04% 10.70% 15.70% 
Leverage  5.56% 4.03% 6.08% 
Common stockholders’  
equity 7.67% 5.19% 3.66% 
 
Source: Citigroup 10-K 
Note: some items are omitted due to space limit, so numbers may not add up. 
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Appendix C 
Variable definitions and data sources. 
Variable  Definition  Original sources 
Risk measures 
Z‐score  equals (ROA+CAR/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and   Compustat 
CAR =E/A is capital‐asset ratio where E equals total liability – total asset, 
both averaged over 1998‐2008. 
σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998‐2008. Higher Z  
implies more stability 
ln(Z‐score)  equals natural logarithm of Z‐score 
ROA  Return on assets, averaged over 1998‐2008. Higher value implies more  Compustat 
stability 
CAR  Capital asset ratio, averaged over 1998‐2008. Higher value implies more  Compustat 
stability 
σ(ROA)  Equals standard deviation of ROA, computed over 1998‐2008  Compustat 
σ(RET)  equals standard deviation of RET, computed over 1998‐2008. RET is   CRSP 
annual stock return from 1998 to 2008 
write‐down  Sum of accounting write‐down for 2007 and 2008 
Bloomberg and 
10‐K, 10‐Q 
Controls 
size  equals the natural logarithm of the average total asset over 1998‐2008  Compustat 
ln(rev)  equals the natural logarithm of the average total revenue over  Compustat 
1998‐2008 
mb  equals the market‐to‐book value, averaged over 1998‐2008  Compustat 
dir  equals the median director dollar stockholding as of the last year of   RiskMetrics and  
the sample period  Proxy statement 
own  equals the percentage of CEO stock ownership, as of the last year of   RiskMetrics and  
the  sample period  Proxy statement 
age  Firm age, calculated as the difference between 2008 and the year that   Compustat 
firms first appear in the Compustat monthly stock return database 
leverage  equal total liability divided by total asset, averaged over 1998‐2008  Compustat 
ibk  a dummy variable that equals one if investment bank, zero otherwise  Compustat 
ins  a dummy variable that equals one if insurance company, zero otherwise  Compustat 
big  equals 1 if total asset is over $10billions, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix D 
List of financial institutions 
This table lists a sample of financial institutions by assets in descending order. Variable definition can be found in 
Appendix C. For the purpose of comparison, I list write-down data collected by Chesney, Stromberg and Wagner 
(2010) (write-down) and data collected by myself (write-down1). 
             
Company Name  Classification 
Total  
Asset  Z‐score  Leverage  CAR 
Director 
ownership 
write‐ 
down 
write‐ 
down1 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP  Commercial banks 1,027,890.64 25.11 0.92 0.08  14.89  42,600 19,872
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO  Commercial banks 1,014,138.55 20.21 0.93 0.07  13.32  33,100 33,100
MORGAN STANLEY  Investment banks 656,829.09 14.27 0.96 0.04  14.24  21,500 21,500
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP  Life insurance  641,511.09 2.94 0.89 0.11  14.13  87,400 62,979
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC  Investment banks 537,268.09 22.07 0.95 0.05  16.02  7,200 6,065
WELLS FARGO & CO  Commercial banks 455,839.45 22.72 0.91 0.09  15.15  23,400 23,400
WACHOVIA CORP  Commercial banks 432,197.60 24.38 0.91 0.09  14.50  101,800 101,800
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC  Life insurance  366,882.20 16.70 0.94 0.06  13.97  5,612 8,700
METLIFE INC  Life insurance  362,102.55 23.88 0.94 0.06  13.10  12,700 12,700
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC  Investment banks 335,290.60 29.30 0.96 0.04  14.49  16,200 16,200
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC  Investment banks 235,648.92 25.02 0.97 0.03  14.95  3,200 0
U S BANCORP  Commercial banks 168,807.23 24.16 0.91 0.09  15.49  4,866 3,700
SUNTRUST BANKS INC  Commercial banks 139,000.79 39.15 0.91 0.09  13.93  4,164 6,100
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP  Life insurance  124,429.77 25.90 0.95 0.05  14.92  1,598 9,289
NATIONAL CITY CORP  Commercial banks 117,415.27 19.65 0.92 0.08  13.46  25,400 25,400
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GRP INC  Life insurance  112,151.85 29.90 0.94 0.06  13.65  1,385 4,400
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP  Commercial banks 109,227.27 17.74 0.90 0.10  14.11  2,826 480
GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC  Life insurance  107,529.33 19.11 0.88 0.12  10.81  2,537 2,421
NATIONWIDE FINL SVCS  ‐CL A  Life insurance  103,118.15 37.03 0.96 0.04  12.72  1,504 1,650
PNC FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP INC  Commercial banks 102,734.09 18.20 0.90 0.10  13.85  2,883 2,406
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC  Investment banks 96,782.67 24.60 0.92 0.08  11.43  958 1,987
STATE STREET CORP  Commercial banks 94,185.00 62.92 0.94 0.06  14.19  1,200 6,039
BB&T CORP  Commercial banks 90,405.84 53.11 0.91 0.09  15.32  2,829 6,882
KEYCORP  Commercial banks 89,275.27 11.12 0.92 0.08  13.93  2,000 2,000
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP  Commercial banks 80,955.16 10.67 0.90 0.10  14.01  4,900 4,328
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REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 78,609.52 7.43 0.90 0.10  14.08  10,382 10,597
COMERICA INC  Commercial banks 51,502.12 25.51 0.91 0.09  14.00  1,523 1,026
NORTHERN TRUST CORP  Commercial banks 47,478.26 58.09 0.93 0.07  13.18  283 182
M & T BANK CORP  Commercial banks 43,839.52 51.35 0.90 0.10  14.27  309 786
UNIONBANCAL CORP  Commercial banks 42,569.22 60.15 0.91 0.09  11.70  615 795
SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP  Investment banks 41,199.04 7.38 0.91 0.09  14.80  75 276
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP  Commercial banks 39,234.56 7.52 0.90 0.10  14.35  5,511 2,300
POPULAR INC  Commercial banks 36,476.47 6.14 0.93 0.07  16.48  1,333 807
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  Commercial banks 34,732.61 18.09 0.91 0.09  14.20  1,701 2,200
ZIONS BANCORPORATION  Commercial banks 33,448.05 20.97 0.91 0.09  15.19  565 1,000
E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP  Investment banks 29,426.68 8.95 0.89 0.11  13.53  5,382 3,655
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP  Commercial banks 26,992.31 10.34 0.93 0.07  13.48  1,461 1,143
PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP  Life insurance  25,791.57 21.87 0.93 0.07  12.81  587 1,650
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 22,600.93 11.95 0.89 0.11  14.93  1,456 1,269
COLONIAL BANCGROUP  Commercial banks 17,565.28 6.00 0.93 0.07  13.06  1,910 2,108
ASSOCIATED BANC‐CORP  Commercial banks 17,278.21 47.38 0.91 0.09  14.25  467 113
WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 14,259.03 11.07 0.91 0.09  14.04  551 842
COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC  Commercial banks 13,774.55 71.57 0.90 0.10  13.61  187 164
TORCHMARK CORP  Life insurance  13,396.81 52.26 0.79 0.21  14.40  115 194
TCF FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 12,726.97 27.19 0.92 0.08  15.06  384 384
FIRST BANCORP P R  Commercial banks 12,253.73 23.83 0.93 0.07  13.60  351 740
JEFFERIES GROUP INC  Investment banks 11,550.13 8.51 0.90 0.10  13.97  267 24
BANK OF HAWAII CORP  Commercial banks 11,348.91 23.17 0.92 0.08  14.16  120 81
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP  Investment banks 10,752.83 5.20 0.90 0.10  13.21  36 28,324
FULTON FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 10,453.88 24.67 0.90 0.10  14.90  200 331
FIRSTMERIT CORP  Commercial banks 10,077.32 54.64 0.91 0.09  13.79  89 166
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP INC  Commercial banks 9,636.92 7.42 0.90 0.10  12.56  1,116 1,264
WILMINGTON TRUST CORP  Commercial banks 9,090.36 19.10 0.91 0.09  13.74  341 291
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL CORP  Investment banks 8,999.96 39.66 0.87 0.13  13.06  18 105
UMB FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 8,495.63 111.09 0.91 0.09  12.73  27 57
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OLD NATIONAL BANCORP  Commercial banks 8,293.04 45.59 0.92 0.08  14.07  60 77
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC  Commercial banks 7,240.39 55.00 0.89 0.11  13.47  157 275
FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP INC  Commercial banks 6,754.64 34.47 0.92 0.08  13.67  190 194
UCBH HOLDINGS INC  Commercial banks 6,385.02 15.44 0.93 0.07  13.81  311 449
UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV  Commercial banks 6,211.21 55.05 0.91 0.09  13.98  109 65
EAST WEST BANCORP INC  Commercial banks 6,027.71 18.48 0.91 0.09  14.63  281 460
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 5,499.98 40.09 0.93 0.07  13.32  43 128
SVB FINANCIAL GROUP  Commercial banks 5,461.04 19.05 0.88 0.12  12.80  119 321
CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP  Commercial banks 5,385.44 30.14 0.89 0.11  15.75  194 956
UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS INC  Commercial banks 5,260.12 15.83 0.92 0.08  15.31  222 428
FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL CP/PA  Commercial banks 5,244.15 51.42 0.91 0.09  13.39  18 78
CORUS BANKSHARES INC  Commercial banks 5,210.06 5.90 0.88 0.12  11.48  726 724
HANCOCK HOLDING CO  Commercial banks 4,584.19 49.16 0.90 0.10  13.69  44 74
DELPHI FINANCIAL GRP  ‐CL A  Life insurance  4,482.30 18.89 0.82 0.18  14.54  79 148
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 4,414.82 3.09 0.92 0.08  12.52  731 792
SWS GROUP INC  Investment banks 4,382.49 12.61 0.94 0.06  13.90  2,962 12
WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION  Commercial banks 4,340.53 58.53 0.92 0.08  13.37  3 81
NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC  Commercial banks 4,129.49 37.44 0.91 0.09  14.48  140 180
PRESIDENTIAL LIFE CORP  Life insurance  3,925.70 13.81 0.86 0.14  11.70  28 9,240
UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP  Commercial banks 3,905.03 50.95 0.87 0.13  13.67  154 397
FIRST FINL BANCORP INC/OH  Commercial banks 3,660.24 35.52 0.91 0.09  13.47  23 31
COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM INC  Commercial banks 3,541.90 59.74 0.91 0.09  14.96  10 19
CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL CP  Commercial banks 3,413.58 9.33 0.90 0.10  12.64  548 410
BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HOLDINGS  Commercial banks 3,247.73 5.11 0.91 0.09  13.30  569 852
PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC  Commercial banks 3,049.64 82.31 0.89 0.11  15.96  24 63
S & T BANCORP INC  Commercial banks 2,912.55 71.32 0.89 0.11  14.37  23 48
PRIVATEBANCORP INC  Commercial banks 2,890.18 14.20 0.93 0.07  15.27  126 469
GLACIER BANCORP INC  Commercial banks 2,842.76 74.22 0.90 0.10  14.17  51 47
PACWEST BANCORP  Commercial banks 2,735.07 2.30 0.87 0.13  13.72  826 854
LABRANCHE & CO INC  Investment banks 2,585.85 6.32 0.68 0.32  12.13  171 681
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INDEPENDENT BANK CORP/MI  Commercial banks 2,455.54 5.84 0.93 0.07  13.16  101 131
FIRST FINL BANKSHARES INC  Commercial banks 2,305.56 127.76 0.89 0.11  15.32  10 17
HANMI FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 2,266.34 7.19 0.90 0.10  16.00  282 401
PIPER JAFFRAY COS INC  Investment banks 2,156.83 5.05 0.64 0.36  13.35  131 11
TOMPKINS FINANCIAL CORP  Commercial banks 1,785.19 63.88 0.91 0.09  13.94  7 16
STERLING BANCORP/NY  Commercial banks 1,670.66 30.74 0.92 0.08  13.43  14 35
NARA BANCORP INC  Commercial banks 1,325.58 20.72 0.92 0.08  14.11  59 91
WILSHIRE BANCORP INC  Commercial banks 1,247.77 33.73 0.93 0.07  16.27  2 43
CASCADE BANCORP  Commercial banks 1,097.31 4.28 0.91 0.09  12.53  199 214
WADDELL&REED FINL INC  ‐CL A  Investment banks 566.17 6.66 0.62 0.38  14.14  14 7
OPTIONSXPRESS HOLDINGS INC  Investment banks 428.16 1.95 0.44 0.56  14.85  7 7
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Appendix E 
Data verification 
This table shows the outliers in my sample. The data has been verified to be accurate. 
       Outliers  Check          
tic  gvkey  Z‐score  ln(at)  mb  leverage  roa  median_d  ceo_own
SIEB  7315  10.730  3.691  3.355  0.137  0.065  11.738  0.889 
THFF  18276  133.272  7.657  1.063  0.887  0.011  13.069  0.002 
ALAB  31062  187.861  8.258  1.079  0.917  0.011  15.320  0.007 
BMRC  31764  94.612  6.522  1.081  0.907  0.012  9.284  0.000 
SHBK  65426  203.143  5.298  1.027  0.897  0.010  13.438  0.039 
WDR  66599  6.663  6.339  4.568  0.624  0.175  14.137  0.018 
BGCP  127377  5.157  5.796  3.735  0.173  ‐0.031  12.930  0.874 
OCNB  150478  120.189  5.258  1.060  0.884  0.005  12.613  0.062 
OXPS  162175  1.952  6.060  4.756  0.442  0.562  14.851  0.004 
 
 
 Appendix F 
Governance indices as explanatory variables. 
      G-index is obtained from Andrew Metrick’s website, and E-index is obtained from Lucian Bebchuck’s website. I require non-missing data on G-index, E-index and director ownership for the 
purpose of direct comparison of these three governance measures.  Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust 
means robust regression or iteratively reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS regressions are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980).Regression variables 
are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio, both averaged 
over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score. ln(rev) is the logarithm of  total 
revenue. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and 
the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
       Panel A:Z-score          
  G-index       E-index     Director Ownership   
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS VARIABLES Median Robust OLS VARIABLES Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -1.269 -2.172 -3.653** ln(at) -1.459 -2.320 -3.781** ln(at) -0.932 -2.612 -4.276** 
(2.179) (1.612) (1.600) (2.304) (1.626) (1.662) (2.209) (1.614) (1.633) 
mb -3.525 -4.257 -5.927* mb -3.725 -4.353 -6.048* mb -2.833 -5.739 -8.676** 
(5.178) (6.092) (3.141) (5.461) (6.146) (3.241) (5.495) (6.126) (3.639) 
G-index 0.247 -0.0489 -0.256 E-index 0.530 0.496 -2.003 dir 3.444 3.471* 6.263** 
(0.978) (0.736) (0.890) (2.198) (1.585) (2.862) (2.656) (1.878) (2.881) 
own -63.33 -59.88 -51.99 own -63.05 -56.64 -61.97 own -32.57 -44.55 -26.42 
(61.43) (50.64) (50.78) (65.95) (51.32) (54.48) (59.04) (50.11) (48.82) 
age -0.0839 0.207 0.202 age -0.0679 0.239 0.180 age -0.0873 0.214 0.226 
(0.258) (0.190) (0.253) (0.274) (0.191) (0.273) (0.262) (0.189) (0.243) 
ibk -15.46 -13.99* -19.36*** ibk -15.34 -13.62* -21.01** ibk -15.29 -12.31 -15.07** 
(10.13) (7.661) (7.049) (10.90) (7.846) (8.300) (10.57) (7.710) (6.487) 
ins -1.085 0.436 -2.321 ins -1.011 0.725 -2.541 ins 0.732 2.159 0.749 
(8.129) (6.516) (7.086) (8.623) (6.577) (7.332) (8.893) (6.563) (6.183) 
Constant 45.84* 53.64*** 76.75*** Constant 48.36* 52.64*** 82.70*** Constant -6.438 9.974 -6.048 
(23.24) (18.08) (20.41) (24.55) (18.43) (25.34) (40.57) (29.68) (33.74) 
Observations 117 117 117 Observations 117 117 117 Observations 117 117 117 
R-squared   0.090 0.092 R-squared   0.095 0.100 R-squared   0.118 0.146 
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 Appendix F (continued) 
          Panel B: ln(Z-score)             
G-index E-index Director ownership 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   VARIABLES Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.049 -0.058 -0.055 ln(at) -0.058 -0.060 -0.059 ln(at) -0.034 -0.076 -0.073 
(0.063) (0.058) (0.050) (0.075) (0.058) (0.050) (0.097) (0.056) (0.049) 
mb -0.221 -0.227 -0.222* mb -0.225 -0.229 -0.226* mb -0.208 -0.296 -0.297** 
(0.147) (0.218) (0.121) (0.174) (0.218) (0.120) (0.238) (0.213) (0.122) 
G-index 0.011 -0.013 -0.015 E-index 0.024 -0.035 -0.043 dir 0.167 0.167** 0.169** 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.071) (0.056) (0.061) (0.118) (0.065) (0.068) 
own -2.894 -2.598 -2.491 own -3.055 -2.645 -2.589 own -2.870 -1.848 -1.707 
(1.918) (1.810) (1.708) (2.133) (1.818) (1.723) (3.031) (1.744) (1.568) 
age -0.003 0.005 0.004 age -0.003 0.004 0.004 age -0.003 0.005 0.005 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) 
ibk -0.914*** -0.761*** -0.764*** ibk -0.929*** -0.789*** -0.791*** ibk -0.792* -0.654** -0.642** 
(0.291) (0.274) (0.286) (0.352) (0.278) (0.295) (0.463) (0.268) (0.285) 
ins -0.050 0.003 -0.006 ins -0.050 -0.004 -0.012 ins 0.086 0.082 0.076 
(0.234) (0.233) (0.192) (0.282) (0.233) (0.193) (0.387) (0.228) (0.164) 
Constant 4.111*** 4.188*** 4.179*** Constant 4.226*** 4.227*** 4.236*** Constant 1.578 1.942* 1.890* 
(0.655) (0.646) (0.570) (0.785) (0.653) (0.583) (1.819) (1.033) (0.971) 
Observations 117 117 117 Observations 117 117 117 Observations 117 117 117 
R-squared   0.148 0.154 R-squared   0.149 0.156 R-squared   0.196 0.204 
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 Appendix F (continued) 
         Panel C: interacting firm size with industry dummies (Dep: ln(Z-score))   
G-index E-index Director ownership 
  (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   VARIABLES Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.200 -0.154** -0.145** ln(at) -0.174 -0.167** -0.157** ln(at) -0.150 -0.153** -0.146** 
(0.132) (0.073) (0.068) (0.129) (0.074) (0.075) (0.132) (0.072) (0.064) 
mb 0.062 0.112 0.104 mb 0.055 0.110 0.100 mb -0.083 -0.029 -0.042 
(0.282) (0.257) (0.145) (0.296) (0.255) (0.138) (0.309) (0.256) (0.157) 
G-index -0.045 -0.026 -0.026 E-index -0.053 -0.069 -0.069 dir 0.124 0.147** 0.153** 
(0.049) (0.026) (0.026) (0.104) (0.057) (0.069) (0.120) (0.066) (0.070) 
own -4.118 -3.217* -3.103* own -4.303 -3.204* -3.155* own -4.275 -2.194 -2.033 
(3.228) (1.860) (1.837) (3.127) (1.855) (1.896) (3.178) (1.839) (1.827) 
age 0.014 0.013* 0.012 age 0.010 0.013 0.012 age 0.006 0.012 0.011 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
ibk -4.642** -4.576*** -4.447*** ibk -4.398* -4.712*** -4.559*** ibk -3.069 -3.619** -3.497*** 
(2.245) (1.639) (1.185) (2.235) (1.644) (1.245) (2.309) (1.607) (1.248) 
ins -1.292 -0.946 -0.882 ins -0.602 -1.281 -1.185 ins -0.698 -0.937 -0.900 
(2.951) (1.777) (1.266) (2.931) (1.813) (1.493) (2.803) (1.747) (1.167) 
ibk*size 0.401* 0.405** 0.392*** ibk*size 0.368 0.414** 0.400*** ibk*size 0.241 0.314* 0.304** 
(0.226) (0.172) (0.119) (0.222) (0.172) (0.122) (0.232) (0.169) (0.128) 
ins*size 0.153 0.108 0.100 ins*size 0.089 0.140 0.129 ins*size 0.092 0.110 0.106 
(0.288) (0.174) (0.123) (0.288) (0.177) (0.145) (0.277) (0.171) (0.116) 
Constant 5.345*** 4.636*** 4.581*** Constant 4.958*** 4.754*** 4.686*** Constant 3.030 2.490** 2.358** 
(1.204) (0.683) (0.647) (1.185) (0.698) (0.727) (1.874) (1.062) (1.015) 
Observations 117 117 117 Observations 117 117 117 Observations 117 117 117 
R-squared   0.195 0.196 R-squared   0.199 0.199 R-squared   0.221 0.229 
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 Appendix G 
Firm size (total revenue) and risk taking 
      The dependent variable is raw Z-score for the first 6 regressions and logarithm of Z-score for the second 6, which are further separated by whether or not they have industry 
controls.  Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust regression or iteratively 
reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS regressions are based on  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Sample consists of 300 financial firms. 
Regression variables are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is 
capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural 
logarithm of Z-score. ln(rev) is the logarithm of  total revenue. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the 
last year in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year 
that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLE
S Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(rev) -2.871*** -3.244*** -4.501*** -1.549 -2.631*** -3.905*** -0.110*** -0.109*** 
-
0.0992**
* -0.0830 
-
0.0785** -0.0517 
(0.926) (0.865) (0.910) (0.945) (1.000) (1.084) (0.0343) (0.0338) (0.0320) (0.0514) (0.0389) (0.0426) 
mb -7.871** -7.847** -8.753*** -2.604 -2.976 -3.250 -0.558*** -0.524*** -0.493*** -0.233 -0.278* -0.189 
(3.302) (3.493) (2.230) (3.588) (3.800) (2.078) (0.136) (0.139) (0.153) (0.198) (0.148) (0.165) 
dir 5.174*** 4.949*** 5.683*** 3.202*** 4.414*** 5.206*** 0.191*** 0.213*** 0.197*** 0.152** 0.195*** 0.164*** 
(1.285) (1.176) (1.671) (1.167) (1.214) (1.740) (0.048) (0.046) (0.052) (0.063) (0.047) (0.054) 
own 0.954 -24.37* -32.21*** 2.352 -13.70 -20.03** 0.0756 -0.702 -1.425 0.118 -0.125 -0.614 
(15.21) (14.43) (12.31) (12.43) (14.77) (10.03) (0.528) (0.565) (0.930) (0.733) (0.577) (0.728) 
age 0.206 0.335** 0.368** 0.0129 0.238 0.273 0.008 0.015** 0.015*** 0.004 0.010 0.009 
(0.158) (0.147) (0.156) (0.148) (0.156) (0.169) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
ibk -17.09*** -14.79*** -16.54*** -0.895*** -0.814*** -1.022*** 
(5.002) (5.330) (3.593) (0.275) (0.209) (0.283) 
ins -2.130 2.769 3.618 -0.0293 0.156 0.0911 
(5.180) (5.720) (5.521) (0.291) (0.221) (0.186) 
Constant -23.90 -15.20 -13.78 -3.144 -13.92 -13.91 1.713*** 1.205* 1.305* 1.905** 1.157* 1.351** 
(17.09) (15.78) (21.49) (15.30) (15.84) (21.82) (0.636) (0.617) (0.697) (0.822) (0.613) (0.681) 
Obs 300 300 300 300 300 300 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R-squared   0.121 0.121   0.147 0.144   0.155 0.149   0.209 0.213 
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 Appendix H 
Firm size (market capitalization) and risk taking 
      The dependent variable is raw Z-score for the first 6 regressions and logarithm of Z-score for the second 6, which are further separated by whether or not they have industry 
controls.  Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust regression or iteratively 
reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS regressions are based on  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Sample consists of 300 financial firms. 
Regression variables are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is 
capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural 
logarithm of Z-score. ln(mkv) is the logarithm of  total market capitalization. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar 
stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference 
between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(mkv) -1.699* -1.393* -2.358*** -1.504** -1.062 -2.002** -0.0613* -0.0373 -0.0144 -0.0581 -0.0229 0.00479 
(0.987) (0.736) (0.847) (0.644) (0.749) (0.875) (0.0336) (0.0292) (0.0317) (0.0373) (0.0295) (0.0341) 
mb -7.988** -8.553** -9.427*** -2.114 -2.316 -2.007 -0.584*** -0.565*** -0.548*** -0.128 -0.270* -0.193 
(4.045) (3.501) (2.131) (3.237) (3.794) (1.794) (0.156) (0.141) (0.149) (0.168) (0.149) (0.157) 
dir 5.021*** 4.749*** 5.546*** 3.031*** 3.859*** 4.664*** 0.166*** 0.204*** 0.186*** 0.158*** 0.177*** 0.146*** 
(1.617) (1.200) (1.709) (1.045) (1.211) (1.737) (0.0540) (0.0473) (0.0533) (0.0603) (0.0473) (0.0534) 
own -6.492 -20.07 -28.02** 2.821 -8.047 -13.36 -0.215 -0.552 -1.203 0.164 0.0897 -0.388 
(18.82) (14.53) (12.83) (11.05) (14.51) (9.857) (0.644) (0.575) (0.931) (0.688) (0.572) (0.743) 
ibk -18.55*** -18.84*** -22.31*** -1.004*** -0.962*** -1.145*** 
(4.233) (4.939) (3.027) (0.247) (0.196) (0.254) 
ins -3.148 -2.118 -2.512 -0.0458 -0.00728 -0.0542 
(4.490) (5.284) (5.020) (0.261) (0.206) (0.163) 
Constant -22.50 -15.19 -14.63 -0.0823 -10.19 -11.06 2.032*** 1.270** 1.343* 1.691** 1.307** 1.468** 
(21.26) (15.87) (21.59) (13.58) (15.73) (21.63) (0.713) (0.626) (0.691) (0.781) (0.615) (0.660) 
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R-squared   0.090 0.087   0.132 0.126   0.127 0.124   0.199 0.207 
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Appendix I 
Firm size (for firms with total assets less than 10 billion dollars only) and risk taking 
      The dependent variable is raw Z-score for the first 6 regressions and logarithm of Z-score for the second 6, which are further separated by whether or not they have industry controls.  Results 
from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust regression or iteratively reweighted least squares (RREG in 
STATA), OLS regressions are based on  heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Sample consists of 300 financial firms. Regression variables are computed as the averages 
over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the 
standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score. ln(rev) is the logarithm of  total revenue. mb is the average 
market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our 
sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins 
is dummy for insurance companies. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -2.305 -1.868 -2.964 -0.293 -2.898* -4.174** -0.119 -0.0914 0.0132 -0.149 -0.124* -0.0375 
(2.103) (1.664) (2.007) (1.214) (1.654) (1.956) (0.0965) (0.0666) (0.108) (0.0978) (0.0649) (0.0959) 
mb -8.269** -9.709** -11.55*** -1.562 -1.773 -2.006 -0.660*** -0.570*** -0.517*** -0.0947 -0.183 -0.0535 
(4.108) (3.834) (2.556) (3.051) (4.339) (2.138) (0.214) (0.151) (0.150) (0.217) (0.167) (0.179) 
dir 6.721*** 5.767*** 6.577*** 2.827** 4.848*** 5.781*** 0.252*** 0.263*** 0.213*** 0.239*** 0.230*** 0.177** 
(1.911) (1.537) (2.224) (1.122) (1.529) (2.190) (0.0874) (0.0597) (0.0749) (0.0889) (0.0587) (0.0719) 
own -11.74 -24.67 -32.82** 2.061 -14.95 -20.53* -0.196 -0.736 -1.224 -0.123 -0.214 -0.522 
(19.68) (16.59) (14.02) (10.69) (16.37) (10.54) (0.939) (0.652) (0.799) (0.883) (0.638) (0.660) 
age 0.562* 0.417 0.393 0.223 0.457* 0.453 0.0231 0.0259** 0.0206 0.0229 0.0266*** 0.0233** 
(0.315) (0.260) (0.300) (0.181) (0.252) (0.278) (0.0148) (0.0101) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0097) (0.0110) 
ibk -22.16*** -23.60*** -28.08*** -1.324*** -1.203*** -1.427*** 
(4.628) (6.591) (4.553) (0.381) (0.255) (0.316) 
ins -7.454 -3.767 -1.921 -0.141 0.0392 0.0342 
(6.573) (9.369) (10.26) (0.488) (0.358) (0.283) 
Constant -46.22* -26.93 -23.16 -5.602 -14.48 -13.04 1.078 0.543 0.464 0.999 0.872 0.872 
(25.63) (20.75) (29.22) (14.77) (20.43) (29.07) (1.188) (0.811) (0.914) (1.189) (0.787) (0.834) 
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 221 221 221 221 221 221 
R-squared   0.111 0.099   0.160 0.146   0.165 0.154   0.246 0.252 
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Appendix J 
Firm size (total asset) and risk taking, separated for commercial banks, investment banks and life insurance. 
      The dependent variable is raw Z-score for the first 3 regressions and logarithm of Z-score for the second 3.  Results from 
three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust 
regression or iteratively reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS regressions are based on  heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors (White 1980). Sample consists of 238 commercial banks. Regression variables are computed as the 
averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and 
CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. 
Higher Z-score implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the 
average market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample 
period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference 
between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: commercial banks only (total assets) 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -5.301** -5.602*** -7.377*** -0.245*** -0.193*** -0.184*** 
(2.058) (1.704) (1.948) (0.086) (0.060) (0.056) 
mb 59.430* 42.908 50.064* 1.983 1.671 1.831* 
(34.923) (30.711) (29.174) (1.437) (1.090) (1.055) 
dir 3.019 5.015*** 5.845** 0.173** 0.194*** 0.177*** 
(2.023) (1.643) (2.425) (0.083) (0.058) (0.068) 
own -28.141 -29.788 -39.049** -2.098 -1.656 -1.545 
(32.772) (29.174) (17.729) (1.497) (1.036) (0.980) 
age 0.403 0.521** 0.605** 0.020 0.019** 0.020** 
(0.305) (0.250) (0.293) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant -40.827 -46.321 -48.430 0.444 0.061 -0.037 
(37.974) (32.862) (34.926) (1.563) (1.167) (1.121) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238 
R-squared   0.072 0.080   0.084 0.082 
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Commercial Banks only (total market cap) 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(mkv) -4.480* -4.430** -5.869*** -0.152 -0.168*** -0.158*** 
(2.537) (1.722) (1.947) (0.092) (0.062) (0.060) 
mb 68.270 57.365* 68.887** 2.021 2.321* 2.414** 
(46.882) (33.778) (32.367) (1.701) (1.215) (1.184) 
dir 3.311 4.717*** 5.511** 0.132 0.189*** 0.173** 
(2.430) (1.650) (2.451) (0.088) (0.059) (0.069) 
own -31.491 -29.708 -39.343** -1.472 -1.661 -1.563 
(43.121) (29.084) (17.955) (1.564) (1.046) (1.006) 
age 0.288 0.388 0.427 0.010 0.016* 0.017* 
(0.366) (0.249) (0.300) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant -67.444 -73.284* -83.472** 0.119 -1.034 -1.040 
(51.838) (37.211) (39.670) (1.880) (1.339) (1.324) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 238 
R-squared   0.056 0.059   0.072 0.071 
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Panel B: Investment banks only 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) 1.815 1.729*** 1.879*** 0.088 0.144** 0.290* 
(1.097) (0.516) (0.524) (0.084) (0.067) (0.143) 
mb -1.437 -1.275 -1.345 -0.274 -0.215 0.025 
(2.319) (1.304) (0.813) (0.197) (0.158) (0.251) 
dir 1.311 0.297 -0.027 0.257* 0.094 -0.099 
(1.787) (1.040) (0.902) (0.145) (0.128) (0.201) 
own 14.773 10.333* 10.122* 0.923 1.417* 1.182 
(12.045) (6.058) (5.429) (0.977) (0.762) (0.759) 
age 0.050 0.073 0.127 0.029 0.014 0.021 
(0.228) (0.125) (0.137) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) 
Constant -21.885 -7.168 -3.958 -2.163 -0.321 0.523 
(20.254) (12.116) (10.707) (1.710) (1.500) (1.583) 
Observations 38 38 38 36 36 36 
R-squared   0.402 0.420   0.331 0.297 
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Panel C: Insurance companies only 
Z-score ln(Z-score) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.398 -0.524 -5.147 -0.013 0.029 -0.184 
(1.306) (1.305) (3.386) (0.044) (0.052) (0.107) 
mb 12.613 22.030 3.866 0.740 1.879 -0.844 
(22.819) (30.684) (41.820) (0.765) (1.213) (2.162) 
dir 3.432* 3.829** 5.905** 0.161*** 0.171** 0.240*** 
(1.652) (1.577) (2.278) (0.055) (0.062) (0.083) 
own -23.323 -46.379 -108.314* -1.296 -1.962 -2.899* 
(27.499) (40.188) (62.187) (0.922) (1.589) (1.454) 
age -0.059 0.029 0.042 -0.002 0.006 -0.004 
(0.188) (0.189) (0.447) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) 
Constant -28.280 -42.329 1.189 0.497 -1.328 2.849 
(36.200) (35.210) (60.327) (1.214) (1.392) (3.087) 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared   0.364 0.291   0.549 0.335 
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Appendix K 
Change in CAR around Basel II Accord (2004) 
This table tests whether there is a significant change in CAR around Basel II Accord. I divided the period 2000—2008 into two 
sub-periods: 2000—2003 (before) and 2005—2008 (after). Year 2004 is excluded because that is the event time. Columns 1 
through 4 show the results from simple comparison of CAR in the before and after period. These results are separated by each 
category. Last column shows the results from a differences-in-differences model where commercial banks are in the treatment 
group and investment banks in the control group. CAR is calculated as the average CAR over the two sub-periods using annual 
data. After is a dummy that equals 1 if it is the 2005—2008 period, and 0 otherwise.  cbk is a dummy for commercial banks. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: CAR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES cbk ibk ins all diff-in-diff 
            
after -0.001 -0.016 0.009 -0.001 -0.016 
(0.002) (0.071) (0.025) (0.009) (0.070) 
cbk -0.263*** 
(0.050) 
cbk*after 0.016 
(0.070) 
Constant 0.090*** 0.353*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.353*** 
(0.002) (0.050) (0.011) (0.006) (0.050) 
Observations 702 78 76 856 780 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.363 
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Appendix L 
Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) IV regression of firm size on risk-taking for commercial banks only. 
      This table reports the results from the second-stage regressions of risk-taking on firm size and control variables, in which firm 
size, instrumented by Delaware, is treated as an endogenous variable. Sample consists of 238 commercial banks. Regression 
variables are computed as the averages over 1998-2008, unless otherwise noted. Delaware is dummy, which equals 1 if a firm is 
incorporated in Delaware. Z-score = (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is capital-asset 
ratio, both averaged over 1998-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher Z-score implies more 
stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score.  σ(RETY) is the standard deviation of annual stock return over 1998-2008. 
σ(RETM) is the standard deviation of monthly stock return over 1998-2008. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the 
market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. 
own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference 
between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for investment 
banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Leverage is debt/asset ratio.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
IV for commercial banks only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Z-score ln(Z-score) σ(RETY) σ(RETM) 
ln(at) -15.992* -0.556** 0.242* 0.197** 
(9.258) (0.272) (0.146) (0.090) 
mb 95.164 3.779** -1.120 0.144 
(59.010) (1.854) (1.201) (0.729) 
dir 8.398** 0.288** -0.079 -0.063* 
(3.504) (0.112) (0.055) (0.035) 
own -45.399* -1.819* 0.163 0.676** 
(23.230) (0.968) (0.925) (0.332) 
age 1.580 0.063** -0.037** -0.023** 
(1.074) (0.031) (0.017) (0.010) 
roa -5.448 -19.695*** 
(9.000) (4.707) 
leverage 2.158 0.700 
(1.849) (1.089) 
Constant -82.965 -1.529 -2.058 -3.351** 
(51.141) (1.683) (2.478) (1.462) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 
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Appendix M 
Fixed effect: two periods (quarterly data) 
            This table shows the effect of firm size on risk taking based on quarterly data from 1998-2008, except for stock return 
volatility which uses monthly stock return data. This period is further divided into two sub-periods, 1998-2003 and 2004-2008. 
Using quarterly data or monthly data, regression variables are computed as the averages over each of the two 4-year periods, 
unless otherwise noted. The dependent variable is raw Z-score, log of Z-score, and monthly stock return volatility, respectively. 
Sample consists of 675 financial firms or 1,210 firm-periods. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on 
assets and CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. Higher Z-score implies more stability. 
Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. 
Period2 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if it is second period, zero otherwise.  Leverage is debt/asset ratio. Standard errors, 
clustered at firm level, are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Z-score ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
        
ln(at) -19.93* -0.281** 0.390 
(11.67) (0.138) (0.965) 
mb 7.663 -0.220 5.191** 
(7.857) (0.170) (2.482) 
period2 8.397 0.0503 -1.206** 
(9.377) (0.0822) (0.479) 
roa -75.85 
(50.16) 
leverage 4.942 
(8.427) 
Constant 245.2*** 6.461*** -2.537 
(79.96) (1.020) (11.83) 
Observations 1,210 1,206 1,210 
R-squared 0.004 0.016 0.147 
Number of firms 675 674 675 
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Appendix N 
Fixed effect: four periods (quarterly data) 
            This table shows the effect of firm size on risk taking based on quarterly data from 1998-2008, except for stock return 
volatility which uses monthly stock return data. This period is further divided into four sub-periods, 1998-2000, 2001-2003, 
2004-2006 and 2007-2008. Using quarterly data or monthly data, regression variables are computed as the averages over each of 
the four 3-year periods, unless otherwise noted. The dependent variable is raw Z-score, log of Z-score, and monthly stock return 
volatility, respectively. Sample consists of 674 financial firms or 2,207 firm-periods. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where 
ROA=π/A is return on assets and CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. Higher Z-score 
implies more stability. Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the average 
market-to-book asset ratio. Period2 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if it is second period, zero otherwise. Period3 and 
period4 are defined accordingly. Leverage is debt/asset ratio. Standard errors, clustered at firm level, are in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Z-score ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
ln(at) 21.989** 0.062 -0.419 
(10.896) (0.101) (0.557) 
mb 3.418 -0.215 4.584*** 
(9.842) (0.290) (1.609) 
period2 38.258*** 0.415*** -1.577*** 
(10.075) (0.065) (0.240) 
period3 61.278*** 0.601*** -3.738*** 
(12.750) (0.090) (0.383) 
period4 -68.392*** -0.516*** 1.610*** 
(15.641) (0.112) (0.489) 
roa -85.888*** 
(31.988) 
leverage 9.437* 
(5.466) 
Constant 2.975 4.236*** 0.010 
(75.147) (0.806) (6.915) 
Observations 2,207 2,198 2,207 
R-squared 0.124 0.213 0.329 
Number of firms 674 674 674 
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Appendix O 
Cross-sectional regression using quarterly data from 2005-2008 
      The dependent variable is logarithm of Z-score (ln(Z-score)) for the first three regressions, and standard deviation of monthly 
stock return (σ(RET)) for the second three. Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median means median quantile 
regression (QREG in STATA), Robust means robust regression or iteratively reweighted least squares (RREG in STATA), OLS 
regressions are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Regression variables are computed as the 
quarterly averages over 2005-2008, unless otherwise noted. Z-score =(ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return on assets and 
CAR=E/A is capital-asset ratio, both averaged over 2005-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 2005-2008. Higher Z-
score implies more stability. ln(at) is the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the average market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of 
median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. own is CEO stock percentage ownership as of the last 
year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat 
monthly stock return database. ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: baseline regression 
ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.172*** -0.159*** -0.130*** 0.003* 0.004*** 0.005*** 
(0.058) (0.051) (0.047) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
mb 0.162 0.496 0.154 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 
(0.617) (0.535) (0.653) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) 
dir 0.228*** 0.235*** 0.216*** -0.003 -0.004** -0.004** 
(0.076) (0.066) (0.069) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
own -1.384* -1.226 -0.812 0.068** 0.046* 0.049* 
(0.821) (0.791) (0.688) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) 
age 0.013 0.015* 0.015** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ibk -0.518* -0.792*** -0.826*** 0.027** 0.027*** 0.024*** 
(0.313) (0.282) (0.236) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
ins 0.133 0.132 0.045 0.021** 0.012 0.005 
(0.318) (0.284) (0.203) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
roa -3.712*** -3.253*** -3.359*** 
(0.487) (0.414) (0.502) 
leverage 0.055 0.076*** 0.077*** 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.029) 
Constant 2.163** 1.516* 1.863* 0.010 -0.000 0.004 
(1.063) (0.912) (0.951) (0.049) (0.040) (0.041) 
Observations 266 266 266 272 272 272 
R-squared   0.130 0.133     0.330 0.316 
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Panel B: baseline regression with industry-size interaction 
ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.314*** -0.259*** -0.228*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.006*** 
(0.083) (0.065) (0.056) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
mb 1.404** 1.042* 0.748 0.052* 0.048*** 0.044** 
(0.692) (0.573) (0.674) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) 
dir 0.235*** 0.227*** 0.214*** -0.004 -0.004** -0.004** 
(0.083) (0.065) (0.068) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
own -1.146 -0.734 -0.356 0.043 0.043* 0.048* 
(0.872) (0.799) (0.690) (0.037) (0.024) (0.026) 
age 0.027** 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ibk -3.388*** -3.148*** -3.077*** 0.082 0.079** 0.060 
(1.096) (0.886) (0.867) (0.054) (0.037) (0.038) 
ins -0.985 -1.227 -0.681 -0.053 0.021 0.019 
(1.600) (1.346) (1.252) (0.058) (0.039) (0.046) 
roa -3.008*** -2.936*** -3.191*** 
(0.678) (0.450) (0.577) 
leverage 0.097* 0.104*** 0.098*** 
(0.053) (0.036) (0.032) 
ibk*size 0.302** 0.270*** 0.264*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.122) (0.099) (0.092) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
ins*size 0.153 0.157 0.092 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.163) (0.136) (0.136) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 1.627 1.670* 1.876* -0.027 -0.021 -0.014 
(1.121) (0.910) (0.955) (0.066) (0.044) (0.043) 
Observations 266 266 266 272 272 272 
R-squared   0.157 0.159     0.330 0.318 
 Appendix P 
Decomposition of Z-score using quarterly data from 2005-2008 
      The dependent variables are CAR, ROA, and σ(ROA), respectively. Results from three estimation methods are presented: Median is median quantile regression, Robust is 
robust regression or iteratively reweighted least squares, OLS is ordinary least squares with White heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. Regression variables are computed as 
the quarterly averages over 2005-2008, unless otherwise noted Following Houston et al (2010), ROA is return on assets and CAR is capital-asset ratio, both are averaged over 
2005-2008. σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA over 1998-2008. Higher of ROA and CAR imply more stability. The ROA multiplied by 100 is used in regressions. ln(at) is 
the logarithm of  total asset. mb is the market-to-book asset ratio. dir is the logarithm of median director dollar stockholding as of the last year in our sample period. own is CEO 
stock percentage ownership as of the last year in our sample period. age is firm age as proxied by the difference between 2008 and the year that the firm first appear in Compustat 
monthly stock return database ibk is dummy for investment banks, and ins is dummy for insurance companies. Leverage is debt/asset ratio. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: baseline decomposition 
101
ROA CAR σ(ROA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(atq) -0.007 -0.008 0.036 -0.005*** -0.002** -0.018*** 0.107* 0.164*** 0.160*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.033) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.065) (0.050) (0.042) 
mb 1.496*** 1.477*** 1.101 0.252*** 0.206*** 0.218*** 1.503** 1.153** 1.181** 
(0.053) (0.062) (0.692) (0.017) (0.011) (0.065) (0.700) (0.541) (0.594) 
dir 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.051** -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.118 -0.169*** -0.165*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.080) (0.060) (0.060) 
own -0.329*** 0.081 0.287 0.190*** -0.060*** 0.248*** 0.127 0.411 0.362 
(0.084) (0.091) (0.707) (0.026) (0.016) (0.079) (0.898) (0.748) (0.600) 
age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.001** 0.000* 0.001*** -0.006 -0.010 -0.011* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) 
ibk -0.022 -0.018 -0.252 0.074*** -0.008 0.153*** 0.323 0.296 0.312 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.181) (0.009) (0.006) (0.038) (0.379) (0.296) (0.259) 
ins 0.027 0.066** 0.001 0.020** -0.010* 0.048*** -0.025 -0.114 -0.102 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.103) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.341) (0.260) (0.184) 
roa -2.229*** -5.440*** -2.850 -0.844*** -1.002*** -1.029*** 
(0.478) (0.283) (1.794) (0.165) (0.133) (0.146) 
leverage 0.656*** 0.666*** 1.026 -3.489*** -3.571*** -3.476*** 
(0.085) (0.094) (0.719) (1.190) (0.933) (0.891) 
Constant -2.432*** -2.323*** -2.966*** -0.112*** -0.076*** -0.015 -4.074** -3.240** -3.331*** 
(0.122) (0.133) (1.071) (0.031) (0.019) (0.078) (1.652) (1.287) (1.246) 
Observations 272 271 272 272 272 272 266 266 266 
R-squared   0.736 0.177     0.778 0.691     0.442 0.478 
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Panel B: decomposition with interaction term 
ROA CAR σ(ROA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS   Median Robust OLS 
ln(at) -0.015*** -0.009 -0.037* 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.179** 0.190*** 0.175*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.088) (0.060) (0.051) 
mb 1.484*** 1.580*** 1.481** 0.010 0.071*** 0.050 1.270 1.230** 1.292** 
(0.041) (0.056) (0.608) (0.019) (0.012) (0.055) (0.803) (0.577) (0.638) 
dir 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.053** -0.002 -0.002* -0.003 -0.133 -0.169*** -0.164*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.089) (0.059) (0.060) 
own -0.269*** 0.195** 0.398 0.079*** -0.011 0.135 0.266 0.453 0.414 
(0.065) (0.080) (0.638) (0.026) (0.016) (0.085) (0.868) (0.744) (0.599) 
age 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.008** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) 
ibk -0.847*** -1.375*** -3.270*** 0.698*** 0.646*** 0.693*** 1.463 0.144 -0.097 
(0.097) (0.115) (1.062) (0.032) (0.019) (0.096) (1.742) (1.233) (1.066) 
ins -0.018 -0.190 -0.051 0.100** 0.037 0.163** 2.194 1.643 1.349 
(0.111) (0.130) (0.412) (0.041) (0.027) (0.063) (1.812) (1.234) (0.984) 
roa 0.425 0.536* 1.039 -0.763*** -1.032*** -1.069*** 
(0.505) (0.312) (1.646) (0.212) (0.147) (0.174) 
leverage -0.029 -0.447*** -0.667 -3.158** -3.690*** -3.739*** 
(0.104) (0.120) (1.053) (1.601) (1.142) (1.028) 
ibk*size 0.069*** 0.113*** 0.322*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.131 0.012 0.039 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.103) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.173) (0.124) (0.107) 
ins*size 0.008 0.026* 0.019 -0.011*** -0.005* -0.016** -0.215 -0.181 -0.147 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.045) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.183) (0.125) (0.109) 
Constant -1.721*** -1.275*** -1.412 0.090*** 0.043** 0.061 -4.422** -3.365** -3.317** 
(0.123) (0.146) (1.342) (0.030) (0.019) (0.063) (1.951) (1.382) (1.287) 
Observations 272 271 272 272 272 272 266 266 266 
R-squared   0.790 0.315     0.945 0.800     0.451 0.482 
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Appendix Q 
Differences-in-differences model 
This table provides the regression results of the following differences-in-differences model (similar to Purnanandam (2010, 
RFS)): 
0 1 2 3
1
*
k K
it i i it
k
risk after size after size Xβ β β β β=
=
= + + + + +∑ ε  
We divide the 2005-2008 period into two sub-periods: 2005Q1-2007Q1, the before-crisis period, and 2007Q2-2008Q4, the crisis 
period, and compare the risk-taking in these two distinct periods. The dependent variable, riskit, is either Z-score or volatility of 
monthly stock return, calculated using either quarterly or monthly data for firm i for both periods. after is a dummy that is set to 
one for the crisis period, and zero before-crisis period. sizei is the average total asset over quarters before the crisis. X stands for a 
set of control variables. mb is the average market-to-book ratio for firm i; roa is average return on asset for firm i; leverage is 
average debt to asset ratio for firm i. Since we have balanced panel, we take the difference between these two periods and instead 
estimate the following simplified model: 
1 3
1
*
k K
it i it
k
risk size after Xβ β β=
=
Δ = + + Δ +Δ∑ ε  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ln(Z-score) σ(RET) 
Δsize*after -0.121*** -0.113*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.001) (0.002) 
Δmb -0.387** 0.012 
(0.150) (0.011) 
Δroa -0.248 
(0.264) 
Δleverage 0.130 
(0.135) 
Constant -0.310 -0.405* -0.012 -0.011 
(0.221) (0.223) (0.010) (0.015) 
Observations 524 524 524 524 
R-squared 0.029 0.036 0.102 0.120 
 
 
